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I. Introduction
"European employment doctrines [and policies] have always
been a concern for United States-based multinational
corporations."' Europe's employment-related social policy has
generally protected workers more than that of the United States.2
Indeed, the underlying employment law framework in the United
States is the common law doctrine of employment at-will, which
creates an indefinite employment relationship that either party may
' Donald C. Dowling, Worker Rights in Post-1992 European Communities: What
"Social Europe" Means To United States-Based Multinational Employers, II Nw. J.
INT'L L. & Bus. 564, 569 (1991).
2 See id.
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terminate at any time for any reason or no reason at all. ' In
contrast, the European model depends on "comparatively well-
paid, highly skilled and organized workers that receive extensive
social benefits."4  European employment law traditions
affirmatively guarantee job security. Thus, for employment of
undefined length, an implicit assurance of unlimited job tenure
exists. In addition, both union and non-union workers are
typically parties to written employment contracts.6 While the
European model exists broadly throughout the European Union,
each Member State has distinct employment laws. With the
passage of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, however, the EU gained
extended authority over social policy, a concept encompassing
social welfare and labor law.7
This vision of one Union formed around the existing European
Communities framework not only encompasses a single market
with a single currency and the free movement of goods and
people, but also a cohesive social policy including social welfare
and employment laws. Consequently, the governmental
institutions of the EU have embarked on a harmonization of
employment policies across Member States.
Sex equality law is and has been a central focus in EU
employment law.' Sex equality law (known as sex discrimination
law in the United States) has occupied the time and resources of
both administrators and litigators for several years.9 Indeed, seven
years have passed since the Maastricht Treaty expanded EU
authority to include employment matters and the goal of
harmonizing Member States' social policies. Consequently,
American multinational corporations must know and understand
current EU sex equality law.
This Comment will examine the current state of EU sex
See id. at 572.
4 Peter Lange, The Politics of the Social Dimension, in EURO-POLITICS:
INSTITUTIONS AND POLICYMAKING IN THE "NEW" EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, 225, 227 n.8
(Alberta M. Sbragia ed., 1992).
5 See Dowling, supra note 1, at 572-73.
6 See id. at 573.
7 See infra notes 21-27 and accompanying text.
8 See CATHERINE BARNARD, EC EMPLOYMENT LAW § 4.1 (1996).
9 See Id.
1999]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
equality law using American law as a basis of comparison. As a
foundation for understanding sex equality law in the EU, Part II of
this Comment will describe the basic political and legal
framework of the EU.'0 Part III will examine the principle of
equal pay as it is applied in the United States and in the EU,
focusing on the concept of comparable worth." Part IV will
discuss the broader concept of equal treatment law embodied in
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act in the United States and in the
Equal Treatment Directive in the EU.12  Part V focuses on a
specific area of law, sexual harassment, which has exploded in the
U.S. and is currently in a state of expansion in the EU. 3 This
Comment will conclude with observations about the unique and
evolving nature of the EU and the consequent need for American
multinational corporations to monitor the state of EU sex
discrimination law.
II. The Political and Legal Framework of the European Union
A. The Founding Treaties
What is now known as the European Union was created in
April 1951 when the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium,
France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands entered into the
Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community
(ECSC), creating an international trade affiliation. 14 Six years later
these nations further expanded their relationship by forming two
additional communities, the European Economic Community
(EEC)'5 and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom).'6
By 1986, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Ireland, Spain, Portugal,
'0 See infra notes 14-66 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 67-225 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 226-425 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 426-501 and accompanying text.
14 TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY, Apr. 18,
1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140 [hereinafter ECSC TREATY].
15 TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC TREATY].
16 TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY, Mar. 25,
1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter EURATOM TREATY].
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and Greece had acceded, expanding the EEC to twelve members.' 7
The same year, the EEC Treaty was amended by the Single
European Act 8 that set the year 1992 as the goal for completing
the internal market. 9 These three communities, the ECSC, EEC
and Euratom, came to be identified as a single "European
Community."2° In 1992, the members ratified the Treaty on the
European Union, or the Maastricht Treaty. 2' The Maastricht
Treaty integrates the Member States into a political and economic
union" by mandating the creation of a single European Union,
constructed around the existing European Communities
framework. 23  "Union," in this context, means a single currency,
the free movement of goods and people, greater coordination of
common defense and foreign affairs, and more expanded power
over "social policy," a concept encompassing social welfare and
labor law.24 Specifically, the social policy provisions of the EC
Treaty 21 are central to this examination of EU sex discrimination
17 See Jo SHAW, LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 4 (2d ed. 1996).
18 Single European Act, 1987 O.J. (L 169) 1 [hereinafter SEA].
19 See SHAW, supra note 17, at 5.
20 See id.
21 TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Feb. 7, 1992, 1 C.M.L.R.
573 [hereinafter EC TREATY], incorporating changes by the Treaty on European Union,
Feb. 7 1992 O.J. (C 224) 1, 1 C.M.L.R. 719 [hereinafter Maastricht Treaty]. Article G of
the Treaty on European Union renames the European Economic Community the
"European Community," but does not rename the other communities (ECSC and
Euratom). See SHAW, supra note 17, at 5.
22 See Marley S. Weiss, The Impact of the European Community on Labor Law:
Some American Comparisons, 68 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 1427, 1427-28 (1993).
23 See SHAW, supra note 17, at 5.
24 Weiss, supra note 22, at 1427. Initially, the U.K. opted out of the social policy
provisions. See id. at 1430. When no agreement could be reached as to the social
provisions among the twelve Member States, all except the U.K. entered into the
Agreement on Social Policy Concluded Between the Member States of the European
Community With the Exception of United Kingdom of Great Britain and North Ireland.
See id. at 1430-31. This Agreement was annexed to the Protocol on Social Policy, which
was then annexed to the EC Treaty. See id. at 1431 (citing the Protocol on Social Policy
annexed to Treaty on European Union, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 357-58 (1992)). After
Prime Minister Tony Blair's election the U.K. opted into the social policy provisions of
the EC Treaty. See Charles Bremner, EU Will Extend Social Laws to Britain, TIMES
(London), Sept. 24, 1997, at 12.
25 See EC TREATY art. 117-20.
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law.26 These four treaties function as "a constitution or articles of
confederation, creating the EC institutional superstructure and
governing its relations with the Member States and their
citizens."27
B. EU Institutions
The EU is a unique supranational entity. Its institutional
structure differs from the governing structures of traditional
international organizations in that Member States transfer
substantive sovereign power to EU. 2' At the same time,
comparisons between EU-Member State relations and U.S.
federal-state relations lay only a foundational understanding of the
EU's institutional framework.29 The EU more closely resembles a
confederation of nation-states with "a solid base of well-developed
national legal systems" than a "unified federation."3°  Thus, in
many areas of competence, the EU institutional framework
functions to conform Member State laws. 3,
The EC Treaty establishes the institutional branches of the
European Union: the European Parliament (EP), the Council of
Ministers, the Commission, and the European Court of Justice
(ECJ).32 A clear separation of powers does not exist among the
26 See Weiss, supra note 22, at 1427 n.3. Specifically, Article 119 stipulates equal
remuneration for equal work by men and women. See EC TREATY art. 119.
27 Weiss, supra note 22, at 1430. Since the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty the
EU has gained three new members. See SHAW, supra note 17, at 4. In 1995, Austria,
Finland, and Sweden became EU Member States. See id.
28 See SHAW, supra note 17, at 107.
29 See Weiss, supra note 22, at 1434-35.
30 Id. at 1435. Within the EU, advocates advance several different methods of
integrating Europe. See SHAW, supra note 17, at 11-12. The "radical" Federalists
promote a rapid transition to a United States of Europe model. See id. at 11. Neo-
functionalists conceptualize a more pragmatic, incremental model of European
integration. See id.
31 See Weiss, supra note 22, at 1435.
32 See ROGER BLANPAIN AND CHRIS ENGELS, EUROPEAN LABOUR LAW 42 (1998).
The four-cornered institutional structure embodied by the Commission, the Council, the
EP, and ECJ is supplemented by various subsidiary institutions including the Economic
and Social Committee, the Court of Auditors, and the Committee of the Regions. See
SHAW, supra note 17, at 107-08.
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EU institutions.33  The EC Treaty divides legislative functions
between the Council and the Parliament, with input from the
Commission and various subsidiary bodies.34 The Commission
mainly acts as the executive." Yet the Council delegates powers
to the Commission and retains control over that body through a
committee structure, which in turn must exercise its powers with
the cooperation of the Member States.36 Finally, judiciary power
vests in the ECJ. The ECJ supervises the divisions of power
among the institutions and between the EU and the Member
States.37 Furthermore, unlike the Supreme Court of the United
States, the ECJ has the power to give advisory opinions.38
C. Sources of Law
The EU has three main sources of law. The founding treaties,
which the ECJ now characterizes as the "constitutional charter,"
constitute the primary sources of EU law. " Much of the
"constitutional law," however, is created through the judicial
pronouncements and decisions of the ECJ.4 °  The ECJ has
established four main principles of EU law: (1) EU law penetrates
Member States' legal systems, must be applied by State courts,
33 See SHAW, supra note 17, at 107.
14 See id.
35 See id.
36 See id. The EU law-making process begins when the Commission issues a
proposal, sometimes with the advice of an EC committee. See Dowling, supra note 1, at
577. Next, the Parliament comments and suggests any changes. See id. The
Commission may adopt the suggestions by amending the proposal and resubmitting it
back to the Parliament. See id. Finally, the Commission must ratify the proposal. See
id.
37 See SHAW, supra note 17, at 107.
38 See id. at 231-32. Because a central objective of the EU legal order is to achieve
the intermeshing of EC law and national law, the legal framework must have an "organic
mechanism for ensuring the uniform application of EC law." Id. Article 177 of the EC
Treaty serves this function by providing a reference procedure for national courts to
receive preliminary rulings from the ECJ on the interpretation of EC law. See id.
39 SHAW, supra note 17, at 16.
40 See id. The ECJ has played a central role in furthering integration of the EU
through its "maximalist interpretation of the authority and effect of EC law, of the
regulatory and policy-making competence of the institutions and of its power to control
both the institutions and the Member States to ensure that 'the law is observed."' Id. at
16.
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and is subject to ECJ rulings on its interpretation, effect, and
validity; (2) EU law bestows rights on individuals that State courts
must enforce; (3) EU law preempts conflicting State law; and (4)
Member States must reverse "the effects of violations" of EU law
"which affect individuals.",4' The third source of law is legislative
in nature. The EC Treaty empowers the Council and Commission
to make regulations or decisions referred to as secondary or
derived legislation.42
EU legislation is divided into hard and soft laws.43 Soft laws,
"including Recommendations, Opinions, and other non-Treaty
Acts," serve as guidance to the Member States." In contrast, hard
laws, including Regulations, Directives, and Decisions, have a
binding effect on all Member States or the addressees.45
Decisions are measures that bind individual addressees rather than
set a general norm, and may be addressed either to natural or legal
46persons or Member States. Regulations serve to ensure
uniformity of law throughout the Union, therefore they
"automatically render inapplicable conflicting provisions of
national law., 47 Directives enact EU policy objectives and, at the
same time, achieve approximation of Member States' national
law.48  A directive requires Member States to enact or change
national law to achieve an EU policy objective.49 Thus, directives
give Member States the flexibility to implement EU law while
retaining their own legal traditions5 ° For these reasons, directives
41 Id. at 17.
42 See BARNARD, supra note 8, § 1.28.
41 See id.
44 Id. § 1.33. Although soft laws technically have no binding force, the ECJ has
ensured that they have some legal effect. For instance, in Case 113/75, Giordano
Frecassetti v Amministrazione della Finanze della Stato, 1976 E.C.R. 983, the ECJ
concluded that national courts may consider a recommendation when interpreting a
national statute that implements the recommendation. See Case 113/75, 1976 E.C.R.
983, 996-97.
45 See BARNARD, supra note 8, § 1.28.
46 See BLANPAIN AND ENGELS, supra note 32, at 57.
47 BARNARD, supra note 8, § 1.28.
48 See id.
49 See SHAW, supra note 17, at 200.
50 See Weiss, supra note 22, at 1435.
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are the most prevalent form of EU law.5'
D. Directives
A complete understanding of sex discrimination law in the EU
requires a closer examination of directives. Directives may be
enforced at the Community level or at the national level. 52 At the
Community level, the Commission may bring cases against a
Member State for non-implementation or inadequate
implementation of directives.53 These cases have allowed the ECJ
to rule on the reasons invoked by Member States to justify their
failure to implement a particular directive.5 4 As with other forms
of hard law, the ECJ has held that directives are capable of direct
judicial enforcement at the national level provided that they are
sufficiently precise and unconditional." Indeed, directives may
give rise to rights which individuals can enforce in national
courts.56 More specifically, if a Member State has not yet adopted
implementing national legislation or has done so improperly,
individuals may bring claims to enforce the directive against their
Member States in their national court systems.7 This principle has
been termed "vertical direct effect."58  As held by the ECJ in
Marshall 1,59 a directive in and of itself does not provide a cause of
action between individuals, known as "horizontal direct effect."6 °
Only national law can directly create obligations for individuals."
5' See id.
52 See SACHA PRECHAL, DIRECTIVES IN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 8-9 (1995).
51 See id.
54 See id. at 9.
55 See SHAW, supra note 17, at 265. The ECJ determines whether a directive is
sufficiently precise, unconditional, and nondiscretionary on a case by case basis. See
Gina L. Ziccolella, Comment, Marshall II: Enhancing the Remedy Available to
Individuals for Gender Discrimination in the EC, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 641, 657
(1994).
56 See Case 41/74, Van Duyn v. Home Office, 1974 E.C.R. 1337.
57 See Ziccolella, supra note 55, at 647.
58 See id. at 648.
51 Case 190/87, Marshall v. Southampton and South West Hampshire Area Health
Auth., 1986 E.C.R 723 (known as Marshall I).
60 See id.; see also PRECHAL, supra note 52, at 9.
61 See PRECHAL, supra note 52, at 62.
1999]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
Generally, a Member State must implement the directive through
national legislation in order for a directive to have horizontal
direct effect.62 Under certain circumstances, however, a directive
may create an affirmative obligation even though the Member
State has not implemented the directive in national law.63 The ECJ
establishes the individual obligation by interpreting national law in
conformity with the directive.4 Individual obligations may also
arise if the ECJ construes a directive together with a directly
effective provision of the EC Treaty.65 Certain treaty provisions
may impose obligations on individuals; thus, if a provision of a
directive and a relevant EC Treaty provision converge, the ECJ
may impose the resulting obligation on individuals.66
III. Equal Pay
The EU principle of equal pay as an anti-discrimination
concept is further advanced than the U.S. principle. Specifically,
EU law embraces the theory of comparable worth rejected by U.S.
courts during the Reagan-Bush years." This section will first
discuss the differences between the "substantially equal" theory
embodied in U.S. law and the EU standard of comparable worth.
It will then examine the current state of equal pay law in the
United States and in the EU. This section will also highlight the
practical differences between the United States' and EU's
application of the principle of equal pay.
A. Substantially Equal vs. Comparable Worth
Understanding the difference between the substantially equal
theory and comparable worth is essential to comprehending the
theoretical and practical differences between U.S. and EU law in
this area. The substantially equal theory requires employers to pay
62 See id.
63 See id.
6 See id. The ECJ reached this result in Case C-177/88, Decker v. Stichting
Vormingscentrum voor Jong Volwassenen Plus, 1990 E.C.R. 1-3941.
65 See PRECHAL, supra note 52, at 63.
66 See id. at 63-64.
67 See Dowling, supra note 1, at 605.
68 See Weiss, supra note 22, at 1446.
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equal compensation to male and female workers who perform jobs
that require equal skill, effort, and responsibility under similar
working conditions.' 9  The controlling factor is not the job's
official title, but its required duties.7° Thus the U.S. standard is
equal pay for equal work.7 In contrast, the comparable worth
standard embraced by EU law sets forth an equal pay for equal
value standard.72 Comparable worth theory posits that jobs in
which women have historically worked should pay the same as
jobs in which men have historically worked if these jobs have
comparable value.73
B. U.S. Law
1. Equal Pay Act
In the United States, claims for equal pay fall under the Equal
Pay Act of 196374 as well as under the broad prohibition against
sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964."5 Congress intended the Equal Pay Act to be limited in
scope, simply guaranteeing equal pay for equal work.7 6 The statute
69 See Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195 (1974).
70 See Pearce v. Wichita County, 590 F.2d 128, 133 (5th Cir. 1979).
71 See Cynthia Reddick-Martin, Note, Women's Right to Equal Pay in the
International Workplace: Is the United States a Poor Leader and a Poor Follower?, 9
FLA. J. INT'L L. 479, 493 (1994).
72 See id.
73 See Stephen A. Mazurak, Comparative Labor and Employment Law and the
American Labor Lawyer, 70 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 531, 538-39 (1993).
74 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1988) (amending the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29
U.S.C. §§ 210-219 (Supp. 1976)).
71 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 to -17 (1988).
76 See County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 184-88 (1981) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist chronicled the legislative history of the Equal Pay Act
and concluded it was limited only to "equal pay for equal work." Id. at 184. He stated,
"Congress carefully considered and ultimately rejected the 'equal pay for comparable
worth' standard." Id.; see also Sandra J. Libeson, Comment, Reviving the Comparable
Worth Debate in the United States: A Look Toward the European Community, 16 COMP.
LAB. L. 358, 364-65, n.38 (1995). The relevant part of the Equal Pay Act reads:
(1) No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section
shall discriminate, within any establishment in which such employees are
employed, between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. [Vol. 25
has three main provisions: (1) the equal pay for equal work
standard; (2) four affirmative defenses;77 and (3) limitations on
remedies.78 The equal pay standard requires the plaintiff and
comparator to have "substantially equal," not identical, jobs.79
Women can bring a claim under the Equal Pay Act only if they are
paid a lower rate as compared to men who have substantially equal
jobs at the same business establishment.0 Consequently, the
Equal Pay Act has only eliminated the most egregious form of pay
inequity, in which men and women perform identical jobs under
different job titles and receive unequal pay.8  In Laffey v.
Northwest Airlines,2 for instance, female "stewardesses" brought a
claim under the Equal Pay Act asserting that although their jobs
were equal to male "pursers," they were compensated at a lower
rate.83 The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower
court's holding that defendant's compensation scheme violated the
Equal Pay Act.84 The plaintiffs in Laffey argued their claim under
the equal pay theory." Therefore, the court simply determined
employees in such establishment at a rate less than the rate at which he pays
wages to employees of the opposite sex in such establishment for equal work on
jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort and responsibility, and
which are performed under similar working conditions, except where such
payment is made pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a
system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a
differential based on any other factor other than sex: Provided, That an
employer who is paying a wage rate differential in violation of this subsection
shall not, in order to comply with the provisions of this subsection, reduce the
wage rate of any employee.
29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1).
77 See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)(i)-(iv).
78 29 U.S.C. § 206(d).
" Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429, 448-49 (D.C. Cir. 1976) ("[I]t
is now well settled that jobs need not be identical in every respect before the Equal Pay
Act is applicable; the phrase 'equal work' does not mean that the jobs must be identical,
but merely that they must be 'substantially equal."' (quoting Coming Glass Works v.
Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 203 n.24)).
80 See Libeson, supra note 76, at 365.
81 See id. at 366.
82 567 F.2d 429 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
83 See id. at 429.
84 See id. at 452.
85 See Libeson, supra note 76, at 366.
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whether the work done by female stewardesses and male pursers
was "substantially equal."86 This determination is fundamentally
different from attempting to ascertain the value of the work of the
female stewardesses in comparison to that of male pursers.
87
2. Title VII
In contrast to the narrower focus of the Equal Pay Act, Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19648 forbids discrimination on the
basis of race, sex, religion, ethnicity, and national origin in all
aspects of employment including compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges.89 To prevent conflicts between the Equal Pay Act
and Title VII, Senator Bennett introduced an amendment to Title
VII. 9° The Bennett Amendment, added at section 703(h) of Title
VII, provides that "[i]t shall not be an unlawful employment
practice under this subchapter for any employer to differentiate
upon the basis of sex in determining the amount of wages or
compensation paid or to be paid to employees of such employer if
such differentiation is authorized by the provisions of [the (Equal
Pay Act)]."'" Despite the Bennett Amendment, confusion
continued to surround the relationship between the Equal Pay Act
and Title VII.92
The Supreme Court addressed the relationship between Title
VII and the Equal Pay Act in County of Washington v. Gunther.93
The Supreme Court held that a sex-based claim could be brought
under Title VII even if it did not satisfy the "substantially equal"
standard of the Equal Pay Act.94 Specifically, the Court concluded
that claims for sex-based wage discrimination may be brought
under Title VII even if no member of the opposite sex holds an
86 See id.
87 See id.
88 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 to -17 (1988).
89 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
90 See 110 Cong. Rec. 13,647 (1964).
91 Bennett Amendment, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (Title VII § 703(h))
(1994) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2).
92 See Libeson, supra note 76, at 367-68.
93 452 U.S. 161 (1981).
94 See id. at 165-66.
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equal but higher paying job, provided that the employer's
justification did not fall within the four affirmative defenses set
out in the Equal Pay Act.95 In addition, the Court also remarked on
the narrowness of its holding and expressly avoided ruling on the
issue of comparable worth. 96
Furthermore, the Court emphasized that its interpretation did
not render the Bennett Amendment "superfluous."97 It noted that
the incorporation of the fourth affirmative defense, "a differential
based on any other factor than sex," could have "significant
consequences" for Title VII claims.99 Title VII prohibitions of
discriminatory employment practices were intended to be broad
including both overt discrimination and practices that are facially
neutral but discriminatory in effect. 99 The framework of analysis
and defenses in Title VII litigation reflect this approach. ' ° In
contrast, the EPA was designed to allow employers to defend
against application of the EPA if their pay differentials are based
on factors other than sex.' °' The Court, however, refused to
establish the "precise contours of lawsuits challenging sex
discrimination in compensation under Title VII."'' 2
Thus, the Court in Gunther left the lower courts to determine
what a plaintiff must prove to plead sex-based wage
discrimination under Title VII. For instance, the Fifth and Seventh
Circuits have held that plaintiffs must either produce direct
evidence of intentional discrimination or meet the equal pay
9' See id. at 168.
96 See id. at 166. The Court stated, "[w]e emphasize at the outset the narrowness of
the question before us in this case. Respondents' claim is not based on the controversial
concept of 'comparable worth.' " Id.
97 Id. at 171.
98 Id. at 170.
99 See id.
00Seeid.
101 See id.
'02 Id. at 181. One could argue that the Court's enigmatic remarks about the fourth
affirmative defense precludes the use of a disparate impact theory in Title VII sex-based
wage discrimination claims. See MARK ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW § 4.18 at
242 (1994). Consequently, an employer's reliance on prevailing market rates for setting
wages, standing alone, could not be challenged under a disparate impact theory despite
discriminatory effects on women's pay. See id.
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standard of the EPA in order to state sex-based pay claims under
Title VII.' °3 Notably, these decisions severely limit disparate
treatment claims under Title VII to the rare situations where direct
evidence of intentional discrimination actually exists.i°4  In
comparison, the Eleventh Circuit in Miranda v. B&B Cash
Grocery Store"°5 rejected the approach taken by the Fifth and
Seventh Circuits and held that disparate treatment claims of sex-
based wage discrimination should be subject to the Burdine0 6
framework that allows plaintiffs to use indirect evidence such as
circumstances of discrimination to establish disparate treatment
claims. 10
3. Preclusion of Comparable Worth
The four affirmative defenses set out in the Equal Pay Act and
incorporated into Title VII through the Bennett Amendment have
precluded comparable worth as a theory for recovery. '°8 Courtshave refused to engage in their own comparable worth
03 See JOEL FRIEDMAN AND GEORGE M. STRICKLER, JR., CASES AND MATERIALS ON
THE LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 963 (4th ed. 1997) (citing Plemer v. Parsons-
Gilbane, 713 F.2d 1127 (5th Cir. 1983) and EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d
302 (7th Cir. 1988)).
1o4 See St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 534 (1993) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) ("[I]ndirect proof is crucial to the success of most Title VII claims, for the
simple reason that employers who discriminate are not likely to announce their
discriminatory motive."); see also infra notes 236-55 (discussing disparate treatment
analysis).
'05 975 F.2d 1518, 1526 (11th Cir. 1992).
106 Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). See infra
notes 242-49 and accompanying text for further discussion of the Burdine analysis.
107 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 103, at 963; see also Miranda, 975 F.2d at 1526
(construing Gunther to impose a "relaxed standard of similarity between male and
female-occupied jobs").
108 See UAW v. Michigan, 886 F.2d 766 (6th Cir. 1989) (concluding that
comparable worth statistics alone are not sufficient to establish intentional discrimination
under Title VII); Briggs v. City of Madison, 536 F. Supp. 435 (W.D. Wis. 1982)
(rejecting the contention that plaintiffs could establish a prima facie case under Title VII
by showing that women occupied a sex-segregated job in which they were paid less than
men in sex-segregated jobs); Power v. Barry County, 539 F. Supp. 721 (W.D. Mich.
1982) (refusing to recognize plaintiffs' comparable worth-based claims under Title VII);
Libeson, supra note 76, at 371-72.
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evaluations'0 9 and job evaluations conducted by employers are
often skewed to match prevailing market wages."'° Notably, courts
have held that under disparate treatment theory, employers'
reliance on market rates of pay did not raise an inference of a
discriminatory motive.. nor would market reliance constitute a
type of policy or practice required to assert a disparate impact
claim.1 2 Furthermore, courts have held that even if an employer
does fund an independent wage study and fails to adopt its
recommendations to ameliorate pay disparities between men and
women, this failure does not establish the discriminatory motive
for disparate treatment analysis." 3 Hence, if job valuation studies
do not exist, plaintiffs often lack sufficient comparative evidence
to support their claims, and in cases in which employers actually
do their own studies, the labor market defense often justifies lower
pay to women in sex-segregated occupations."
4
C. EU Law
1. Article 119 of the EEC Treaty
Although US and EU law in the area of equal pay developed
contemporaneously, each has adopted a different theoretical and
practical approach to sex-based wage discrimination. The
principle of equal pay is embodied in Article 119 of the EEC
09 See Plemer v. Parsons-Gilbane, 713 F.2d 1127, 1134 (5th Cir. 1983) (concluding
that if plaintiff could not provide "direct or otherwise clear evidence" of how her
employer valued the differing responsibilities of her and her male successor, the court
would not make its own subjective value judgment).
"10 See Libeson, supra note 76, at 371-72.
"I See UAW v. Michigan, 886 F.2d at 766; AFSCME v. Washington, 770 F.2d
1401 (9th Cir. 1985).
"12 See Beard v. Whitley County REMC, 656 F. Supp. 1461 (N.D. Ind. 1987).
"13 See AFSCME v. Washington, 770 F.2d at 1408 (concluding that employers
should not be penalized for undertaking job evaluations; therefore, the state's failure to
adopt the recommendations of the study is not sufficient to prove discriminatory motive
for disparate treatment analysis); American Nurses Ass'n v. Illinois, 606 F. Supp. 1313
(N.D. 11. 1985) (finding that the funding of a wage study did not compel the employer to
adopt a wage schedule that the study supported because it would discourage employers
from conducting studies).
114 See Libeson, supra note 76, at 372.
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Treaty." 5 Article 119 requires each Member State to "ensure and
subsequently maintain the application of the principle of equal
remuneration for equal work as between men and women
workers.""' 6 Article 119 defines "remuneration" broadly as the
"ordinary basic or minimum wage or salary and any additional
emoluments.., whether in cash or in kind, by the employer to the
workers and arising out of the workers' employment.""' Notably,
the language of Article 119 is almost identical to the Equal Pay
Act of 1963. Indeed, the primary aim of Article 119 is to end
wage discrimination where a woman is employed in the same
capacity as a man."'
As an EEC Treaty provision, Article 119 has vertical direct
effect, granting rights directly to individuals against their Member
State before their national courts." 9 Article 119 also has horizontal
direct effect granting individuals the right to enforce the provision
against other private individuals.12
0
2. Equal Pay Directive
In response to Member States' slow and inefficient
implementation of Article 119,121 the Council adopted the Equal
Pay Directive'22 in 1975. The Equal Pay Directive broadened the
meaning of Article 119. The Directive states, "the principle of
equal pay for men and women outlined in Article 119 of the
Treaty ... means, for the same work or for work to which equal
"5 See EEC TREATY art. 119.
16 Id. Article 119 further states that "equal remuneration without discrimination
based on sex means: (a) that remuneration for the same work at piece meal rates shall be
calculated on the basis of the same unit of measurement; (b) that remuneration for work
at time rates shall be the same for the same job." Id.
117 Id.
118 See Taline Aharonian, Equal Value in the European Union: Fiction or Reality?,
2 BuFF. J. INT'L L. 91, 93-94 (1995). ECJ has also recognized equal pay claims in which
plaintiffs actually are paid less for a job of greater value than the comparator. See Case
157/86, Murphy v. Board of Telecomm Eirann, 1988 E.C.R. 673.
"9 See Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Administrate der Balastihpen, 1963 E.C.R.
1. For a detailed discussion of the fundamentals of EU law see supra notes 39-66 and
accompanying text.
"2I See Case 43/75, Defrenne v. Sabena, 1976 E.C.R. 455 (known as Defrenne II).
.2. See Libeson, supra note 76, at 378-79.
"2 Council Directive 75/117, 1975 O.J. (L 45) 19 [hereinafter Equal Pay Directive].
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value is attributed, the elimination of all discrimination on grounds
of sex with regard to all aspects and conditions of
remuneration."' 123  The Equal Pay Directive enunciates the
principle of comparable worth, and thus addresses "the
undervaluing of jobs undertaken primarily by women, in particular
where the women's jobs are found to be as demanding as different
jobs more usually undertaken by men.' 24
3. Direct vs. Indirect Discrimination
The ECJ has held that Article 119 is directly applicable, 125 for
both direct 126 and indirect discrimination. 127  Direct discrimination
corresponds to what U.S. law labels disparate treatment, while
indirect discrimination corresponds to the concept of disparate
impact.'28 Direct discrimination, for instance, encompasses a claim
that plaintiff is being paid less than her male comparator even
though their jobs have equal value. A notable example of indirect
discrimination is in the context of part-time work. The ECJ has
held that "less favorable treatment of part-time workers is
indirectly discriminatory where considerably fewer men than
women work part-time."' 129 Unless the employer can objectively
123 Id. art. 1. In Case 96/80, Jenkins v. Kingsgate, 1981 E.C.R. 911, the ECJ held
that because Article I was enacted to facilitate the application of Article 119 of the EC
Treaty , it has the same effect as Article 119 itself. Thus, Article I of the Directive has
played a fundamental part in the development of equal pay law. See BARNARD, supra
note 8, § 4.17.
124 BARNARD, supra note 8, § 4.17.
125 See supra notes 52-66 and accompanying text (discussing direct application of
directives).
126 See Case 43/75, Defrenne v. Sabena 1976 E.C.R. 455 (Defrenne II).
127 See Case 96/80, Jenkins v. Kingsgate, 1981 E.C.R. 911.
128 See BARNARD, supra note 8, §§ 4.25-4.26. For a discussion of the concepts of
disparate treatment and disparate impact see infra notes 236-96 and accompanying text.
129 BARNARD, supra note 8, § 4.28; see Case C-360/90, Atberterwohlfahrter der
Stadt Berlin e. v. Bbtel, 1992 E.C.R. 1-3589; Case C-184/89, Nimz v. Frei Hansestadt
Hamburg, 1991 E.C.R. 322; Case 33/89, Kowalska v. Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg,
1990 E.C.R. 1-2591; Case 170/84, Bilka-Kaufhaus v. Weber von Hartz, 1986 E.C.R.
1607; Case 96/80, Jenkins v. Kingsgate, 1981 E.C.R. 911. The ECJ has also held that
Article 119 is directly effective in complex areas of indirect discrimination including
occupational pensions and survivors benefits. See Case C-102/88, Ruzius Wilbrink v.
Bestuur van de Bedrfijfsvereniging voor Overheidsdiensten, 1989 E.C.R. 4311.
Although beyond the scope of this Comment, equal pay law has developed in the
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justify the less favorable treatment, the part-time workers are
entitled to have the same compensation scheme, proportional to
their working time, as the employer applies to full-time workers."3 0
4. Job Classification Systems and Other Mechanisms for
Assessment
The equal value principle requires assessing the value of work
through evaluating the qualifications of workers and clearly
defining their various job functions.' Job classification systems
and job evaluation schemes are ways to ascertain the value of
work."' The Equal Pay Directive does not obligate an employer to
utilize a job classification system to determine pay,'33 but if an
employer does use one, paragraph two of Article 1 requires that it
"must be based on the same criteria for both men and women and
so drawn to exclude any discrimination on grounds of sex."' 13 4
Thus, the Equal Pay Directive seeks to dismantle the inequities of
job classification systems in current use.'35
A job classification system is not the only vehicle for
determining whether the work of a man and woman is of equal
value. A national court may have to make the assessment as to
whether the work is of equal value. 136 In Commission v. UK,'37 the
ECJ held that job classifications were not the only method for
complex areas of occupational pensions and survivors benefits. See BLANPAIN AND
ENGELS, supra note 32, at 272.
130 See infra notes 182-91 and accompanying text for an explanation of objective
justification and employer defenses.
131 See Aharonian, supra note 118, at 94.
112 A distinction between job classification and job evaluations exists. A job
classification is non-analytical in nature and is used to categorize jobs based on their
relative worth, utilizing a whole job comparison. See BARNARD, "supra note 8, § 4.18
n.53. In contrast, job evaluation is a more analytical process that separates a job's
component elements for the process of comparison. See id. Although the analytical
approach is more objective, evaluations are affected by the evaluator's subjective
judgments, based on their individual attitudes, experiences, and backgrounds. See id.
"' See Equal Pay Directive, supra note 122.
134 Id. art 1.
135 See Libeson, supra note 76, at 380-81. The Equal Pay Directive covers pay for
work of greater value as well. See BARNARD, supra note 8, § 4.24.
136 See BARNARD, supra note 8, § 4.21.
137 See Case 61/81, Commission v. UK, 1982 E.C.R. 2601.
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determining job values. The UK law at issue required the
existence of a job classification system before a party could bring
an equal value claim.'38 The ECJ held that individuals must have
the right to initiate a claim that their work is of equal value to a
comparator, notwithstanding employer objections in the context of
adversary proceedings. "' Consequently, Member States must
endow an authority with requisite jurisdiction to determine
whether different jobs are of equal value. 40
Member States have adopted different types of authorities for
equal value assessments.14' In Belgium, France, Italy, and
Luxembourg, labor inspectorates may resolve disputes. 4 1 Under
Irish law, disputes over equal pay may be referred to one of three
equality officers who investigate and give recommendations.
141
5. The Assessment of Value
Job value assessment can be accomplished in several ways, all
controversial.'" Every Member State has now adopted either
through legislation or case law the "job content" approach. 45 The
most commonly accepted method of evaluating the value of job
content in Member State judicial and administrative hearings is
known as the "points method."' 146 This method breaks down each
job into components such as "skill, responsibility, physical and
mental requirements, and working conditions.' 47 An independent
expert assigns points for each factor.14 The total number of points
determines the job's comparative value. 149
138 See id. at 2603.
139 See id. at 2614.
140 See id. at 2616.
141 See BARNARD, supra note 8, § 4.22.
142 See id.
143 See id.
144 See Christopher McCrudden, Comparable Worth: A Common Dilemma, II
YALE J. INT'L L. 396, 411 (1986).
145 See id.
146 See id. at412.
147 Id.
148 See id.
149 See id.
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A British case, Hayward v. Cammell Laird Shipbuilders Ltd.,5 °
amply illustrates the "points method" of assessing the value of job
content.' In Hayward, the woman plaintiff was a cook in the
workers' cafeteria and her male comparators were shop stewards
and craftsman engaged in shipbuilding trades."' All workers were
employees of the same company. 153  The independent expert
designed a "points method" analysis in which the jobs under
evaluation were broken down into factors, then each factor was
rated according to its demand on the worker.14 The five factors
included the following: (1) physical demands; (2) environmental
demands; (3) planning and decision demands; (4) skill and
knowledge demands; and (5) responsibility demands. 5 5  The
expert then made judgments about whether the demand under each
factor was low, moderate, or high. 5 1 On the basis of the
calculations the expert found that the plaintiff's work was of equal
value to her comparators. 157
6. The Structure of Job Classification Systems
While the ECJ made it clear that an employer job classification
system was not the exclusive means of assessing the value of a job
in Commission v. UK, the ECJ specifically addressed the issue of
the structure of an employer's job classification system in
Rummler v. Dato-Druck GmbH.158  A German printing firm
adopted a scheme that based compensation, in part, on the degree
of muscular effort required for particular tasks.' The national
court expressed its misgivings, finding that in practice the criterion
of muscular effort took into account only male standards, which
150 [1984] INDUS. REL. L. REP. 463.
'5' See McCrudden, supra note 144, at 412-13.
152 See id. at413.
'5 See id.
'54 See id. at412.
5 See id. at412-13.
156 See id. at 413 n.101.
' See id. at413.
151 Case 237/85, 1986 E.C.R. 2101.
159 See id. at 2103.
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women might find impossible to meet.60 The ECJ stated that the
nature of the work must be assessed objectively and held that the
employer could consider muscular effort in its pay
determination. 161 At the same time, the ECJ concluded that job
classification systems may not have the overall practical effect of
discriminating on the basis of sex.16  Thus when calculating
physical effort in determining pay, employers could not base their
assessments solely on the characteristics of one sex. Based on the
nature of the work, employers might have to consider "other
criteria in relation to which women workers may have a particular
aptitude."'
' 63
The ECJ again addressed the issue in Union of Commercial &
Clerical Employees v. Danish Employer's Association, Ex Parte
Danfoss 6" The Danish Industrial Arbitration Board referred this
case to the ECJ to determine whether the use of certain criteria
establishing salary supplements was incompatible with the Equal
Pay Directive.16  The Employee's Union presented statistical
evidence that salary supplements resulted in unequal pay between
men and women.166 The salary supplement calculated using three
criteria: employee mobility, special training, and length of
service. 67 Although the documents before the ECJ did not define
the "mobility" criterion, the court examined it using two possible
meanings-either as a reward for quality of work done or for
adaptability and flexibility of working hours and locations.16' As
to the first possible meaning the court explained, "where [the
criterion] systematically works to the disadvantage of women [it]
can only be because the employer has misapplied it. It is
inconceivable that the quality of work done by women should
160 See id.
161 See id. at 2115.
162 See id. at 2114.
163 Id. at2115.
"6 Case 109/88, 1989 E.C.R. 3199.
165 See id. at 3202.
166 See id. at 3201.
167 See id. at 3200.
168 See id. at 3227.
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generally be less good."16 9  Thus, the employer's use of this
meaning of mobility would not be justified.'7 ° If the employer
intended the second meaning, then the mobility criterion could
also disadvantage women who, due to their greater household and
family commitments, cannot organize their time as flexibly as
men. 17' The ECJ examined the second criterion, "special training,"
in the same manner as "mobility."'7 As to the third criterion,
"length of service," the ECJ concluded that length of service goes
"hand in hand with experience. '1 71 Consequently an employer
need not prove the importance of length of service in the
performance of a worker's specific tasks.
174
The ECJ's view on length of service is particularly
controversial because not all jobs have a strong correlation
between length of service and experience. 175  Two years after
deciding Danfoss, the ECJ modified its approach to the length of
service criterion. In Nimz v. Frei Hansestadt Hamburg,176 the ECJ
stated that the objectivity of the length of service criterion depends
on the particular circumstances and the relationship between the
nature of the work and the experience gained from working.
17
Thus, the ECJ concluded that national courts may not simply
accept length of service criterion as valid but must examine the
criterion for a correlation to experience.
7. Scope of Comparison
Another major issue concerning the law of equal value is the
scope of comparison. Member States have generally adopted a
narrow scope requiring that the men and women being compared
169 Id.
170 See id.
171 See id.
172 See id. at 3228.
173 Id.
17' See id. Notably, the length of service criterion may also work to disadvantage
women; due to child bearing and rearing responsibilities, many women must take breaks
from their careers.
175 See BARNARD, supra note 8, § 4.37.
176 Case C-184/89, 1991 E.C.R. 1-297.
177 See id. at 1-311.
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must work for the same employer within the same establishment. '78
Dutch law, however, provides a broader comparative scope that
allows for comparisons to be made between men and women
situated in similar positions in the same section of industry.'79
8. Employer Defenses
Defenses available to employers for the violation of Article
119 and the Equal Pay Directive are limited. 8 ° Unless expressly
mentioned in the relevant national law, commonly known as
derogation, no defense normally exists to a claim of direct
discrimination.' Yet in the context of indirect discrimination, the
ECJ concluded in Bilka-Kaufhaus v. Weber von Hartz"2 that
discriminatory conduct may be permissible if justified by objective
economic reasons not related to sex discrimination."' The ECJ
further found that national courts must decide whether the
compensation practice was objectively justified. The ECJ
articulated three requirements that a practice must meet to qualify
as objectively justified: (1) a genuine need of the enterprise; (2)
necessary for that purpose; and (3) suitable for attaining the
objective pursued. 114 Thus, the employer must not only establishthat the practice was used for a good reason but also that the
8 See McCrudden, supra note 144, at 417. Note that a comparison may be
permissible if the establishments are associated, which requires one company to control
the other or both companies to be controlled by a third company. See id. at 418.
"9 See id. at 420 (citing Act to Lay Down Rules for the Entitlement of Workers to a
Wage that is Equal to the Wage Earned by Workers of the Other Sex for Work of Equal
Value, 2 ILO LEGIS. SERIES, at Neth. 1 (1975)).
180 See BARNARD, supra note 8, § 4.32.
181 See id. The Commission advocates a directive on the burden of proof for Article
4 of the Equal Pay Directive that would allow both direct and indirect discrimination to
be objectively justified. See id. § 4.40. Article 4 requires that Member States take the
necessary measures to void or amend provisions appearing in collective agreements,
wage scales, wage agreements or individual contracts which are contrary to the principle
of equal pay. See Equal Pay Directive, supra note 122, art. 4.
182 Case 170/84, 1986 E.C.R. 1607.
183 See id. at 1617.
' See Richard Townshend-Smith, Economic Defenses to Equal Pay Claims, in SEX
EQUALITY LAW IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 35, 38 (Tamara K. Hervey & David O'Keeffe
eds., 1996).
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means to do so were appropriate and proportional.'85 One problem
with using three requirements is that each allows great latitude for
subjective decision-making by the court; therefore the court's
overall sympathy for the employer may ultimately shape its
decision. "6
The ECJ has recognized objective justifications that take into
account the needs and objectives of the business. For instance, in
Jenkins v. Kingsgate,"'8 the ECJ permitted an employer to pay full-
time workers more than part-time workers to encourage full-time
work.181 In Enderby v. Frenchay Health Authority,189 the ECJ
found that paying certain jobs more to attract workers when the
market indicates such workers are in short supply was a valid
compensation practice, but the national court must determine
whether the market forces were sufficiently significant to provide
the objective justification.90 At the same time, the ECJ has
rejected purportedly objective generalizations about categories of
workers, such as the belief that part-time workers are not as
integrated in the workplace or dependent on their employers.191
9. Burdens of Proof
The ECJ has ruled that in principle the plaintiff bears the
burden of proof in claims of sex-based pay discrimination.' 92 In
Danfoss, the ECJ distinguished between the requisite elements of
proof in claims of direct and indirect discrimination. 9' In cases of
direct discrimination, to establish a prima facie case the plaintiff
must specifically compare the pay of a male and female worker
185 See id. Note that in the context of indirectly discriminatory legislation, the ECJ
has allowed broader considerations to apply. See BARNARD, supra note 8, § 4.33.
186 See Townshend-Smith, supra note 184, at 38.
187 Case 96/80, 1981 E.C.R. 911.
188 See id. at 926.
189 Case C-127/92, 1993 E.C.R. 1-5535.
'90 See id. at 1-5564.
1' See Case 171/88, Rinner Kuhn v. FWW Spezial-Gebaudereingung, 1989 E.C.R.
2743.
192 See Enderby, 1993 E.C.R. at 1-5558.
193 See Case 109/88, Union of Commercial & Clerical Employees v. Danish
Employer's Ass'n, Ex Parte Danfoss, 1989 E.C.R. 3199, 3213.
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and demonstrate that the jobs are of equal value.' 94 By contrast, in
cases of indirect discrimination, the plaintiff may establish a prima
facie case by showing that differences in pay based on neutral
criteria mainly or exclusively disadvantage employees of one
sex. 195 In Danfoss, because the employer's pay structure was not
transparent, the court concluded that specific comparisons in
indirect discrimination cases would deny women the protection of
the Equal Pay Directive. The ECJ concluded that "concern for
effectiveness which thus underlies the directive means that it must
be interpreted as implying adjustments to national rules on the
burden of the proof."'9 6 Thus, once the plaintiff establishes a
prima facie case of indirect discrimination, the burden of proof
shifts to the employer to rebut the presumption.
In Enderby, a subsequent case, the ECJ held that the plaintiffs
had a prima facie case of discrimination if the pay of
predominately female speech therapists was significantly lower
than that of predominately male pharmacists and the two jobs were
of equal value.' 97 The ECJ concluded that the employer may rebut
this presumption by proving objective reasons for the pay
difference that the national court could assess for validity.' 98 The
employer in Enderby asserted that the pay differential resulted
from a separately negotiated collective bargaining agreement that
was internally non-discriminatory, and from the need to attract
pharmacists.199 The ECJ concluded that the employer's reliance on
the bargaining agreement was not a sufficient justification because
such reliance would allow employers to "circumvent the principle
of equal pay by using separate bargaining processes.,, 200 As
discussed above, the need to attract candidates may be an
objective justification if the national courts determine that the role
of market forces was sufficiently significant.'
194 See id.
- See id.
196 Id. at 3226.
'97 See Enderby, 1993 E.C.R. at 1-5535.
'98 See id. at 1-5559.
'99 See id. at 1-5554.
200 Id. at 1-5547.
201 See id. at 1-5564.
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In a more recent case, Hill & Stapleton v. The Revenue
Commissioners and The Department of Finance,02 the ECJ held in
a preliminary ruling that an Irish civil service compensation
system that regressed on the salary scale those workers who
convert from job-sharing/part-time work to full-time work violated
the Equal Pay Directive unless the employer could show it was
objectively justified.03 Almost 98% of all civil servants employed
under job-sharing contracts were women. n04  Under the system,
job-sharers progress along the pay scale parallel to full-time
workers; thus, the hourly pay for the two categories of worker is
identical on each point of the scale.r° Yet when job-sharing
workers convert to full-time work their situation is evaluated in
such a manner that they are placed on the full-time pay scale at a
level lower than that which they held on the pay scale while job
sharing.' 6 A provision of this kind that adversely affects the
mostly female job-sharers without an objective justification would
have discriminatory effect based on sex.207
The employer asserted two justifications: (1) the Civil Service
has an established practice of "crediting" only actual service; and
(2) the practice functions as a reward system that maintains staff
motivation, commitment, and morale.208 The ECJ rejected both of
these justifications.2 0 9 The ECJ found that the first justification
was unsupported by objective criteria and with regard to the
second, the pay system for full-time workers cannot be influenced
21by the job-sharing scheme. r In addition the ECJ noted that an
employer cannot justify discrimination arising from a job-sharing
program solely on economic grounds. 2 1  The ECJ further
recognized that 83% of the job-sharers chose the option to
202 Case C-243/95, 1998 E.C.R. 1-3739.
203 See id. at 1-3772.
204 See id. at 1-3767.
205 See id. at 1-3768.
206 See id. at 1-3769.
207 See id.
208 See id. at 1-3771.
209 See id.
210 See id.
2' See id.
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1 1"" 212
accommodate childcare responsibilities. Also, the ECJ
emphasized that Community policy is to encourage and, if
possible, adapt working conditions to family life. Indeed, the
ECJ recognized that the protection of women in their professional
and family lives is a significant aspect of equality between women
and men.214 Finally, the ECJ found that the Irish Civil Service
compensation practice was a breach of Article 119 and the Equal
Pay Directive unless the Service could provide some other
. .. .. . 211
objective justification.
D. Practical Effects of the Differences Between U.S. and EU
Equal Pay Law
EU law goes far beyond U.S. law in the area of equal pay,
exposing more employers to liability. The most obvious and
fundamental difference is that while U.S. law requires jobs to be
"substantially equal" in order to be compared, EU imposes
liability on an employer for pay differential across job or
professional boundaries.
Moreover, EU law facilitates equal pay claims against
employers. In the United States the main obstacle is the plaintiff's
lack of evidence on how the employer establishes its
compensation scheme, which in turn prevents the plaintiff from
presenting comparative evidence that the jobs in question were in
fact substantially equal but received different compensation. In
Plemer v. Parsons-Gilbane,216 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
suggested that if the plaintiff had evidence of a job evaluation
system that placed equal value on both her and her male
comparator's duties and responsibilities but paid plaintiff less,
then she may have prevailed."' The court, though, refused to
make that assessment of duties and responsibilities. In contrast
under EU law, the employer's failure to have a job classification
system is not fatal to the plaintiff's claim because EU law requires
212 See id. at 1-3772.
213 See id.
214 See id.
215 See id.
216 713 F.2d 1127 (5th Cir. 1983).
217 See id. at 1134.
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that some authority, either administrative or judicial, be vested
with the jurisdiction to make those assessments." 8 Consequently,
a U.S. employer could not avoid liability in Europe on an equal
pay claim by failing to establish a transparent job classification
system. On the other hand, U.S. courts will not recognize a prima
facie case of intentional discrimination even if an employer
institutes an evaluation system, finds inequalities, and then fails to
implement changes."9  U.S. courts do not want to dissuade
employers from designing evaluation plans because they are the
only means by which assessments of worth can be undertaken."O
Under EU law, however, failure to implement changes after a
finding of inequality would establish a prima facie case of direct
discrimination against the employer.
Finally, the ECJ has recognized that part of EU social policy is
to accommodate work and family responsibilities.2 ' Indeed, the
ECJ expressly stated in Hill & Stapleton that the protection of
women in their professional and family lives was an essential
aspect of equality.22 This social policy has ramifications,
particularly in the areas of part-time and job-sharing work
schemes."' The ECJ has held that less favorable treatment for
part-time workers who are predominately female establishes a
224prima facie case of sex-based wage discrimination. In contrast,
the plaintiff's prima facie case under the U.S. Equal Pay Act is
much more exacting, and therefore, more difficult to prove. Under
the EPA, a plaintiff must prove that her job and that of the male
comparator are of "equal skill, effort, and responsibility." '225 U.S.
employers will have to scrutinize their own part-time and full-time
compensation schemes in order to comply with EU law. In order
to protect themselves from liability under Article 119 and the
218 See Case 61/81, Commission v. UK, 1982 E.C.R. 2601.
219 See AFSCME v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1404, 1408 (9th Cir. 1985).
220 See Nurses Ass'n v. Illinois, 606 F. Supp. 1313, 1317-18 (N.D. II1. 1985).
221 See Case C-243/95, Hill & Stapleton v. The Revenue Commissioners and The
Department of Finance, 1998 E.C.R. 1-3739.
222 See id.
223 See id.
224 See, e.g., Case C-360/90, Arbeiterwohlfahrt der Stadt Berlin e. V. v. Botel, 1992
E.C.R. 1-3589.
12 See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 102, § 4.14 at 229.
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Equal Pay Directive, U.S. employers should institute their own job
evaluations to assess their compensation systems and remedy any
sex-based pay inequities.
IV. Equal Treatment
In both the United States and the EU, the right to equal pay
was the first guiding principle in prohibiting sex-based
discrimination in the workplace. Subsequently, the range of
protection has expanded through Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 in the United States and through the Equal Treatment
Directive in the EU. This section will first discuss the concept of
equal treatment in the workplace in the United States based on
Title VII. It will next examine the meaning of sex-based
discrimination as prohibited by the EU's Equal Treatment
Directive. Finally, this section will focus on points at which U.S.
and EU sex discrimination laws diverge in the context of employer
liability.
A. U.S. Law
1. Title VII: Generally
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 16 is the cornerstone
of federal anti-discrimination legislation. Title VII provides broad
anti-discrimination protection based on various protected classes.
The statute prohibits discrimination in employment based on an
individual's "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.""' 7
Under Title VII, it is an unlawful practice "to fail or refuse to hire
or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate . . .
with respect to ... compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment " or "to limit, segregate, or classify ... employees
or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or
tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his [or her] status as an employee. 228
Title VII covers all private employers with fifteen or more
226 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 to -17 (1988 & Supp. 1993).
27 Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
228 Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1) to -2(a)(2).
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employees who are engaged in business affecting commerce.29
State and local governments as employers are also covered. 3 °
The federal government as an employer is excluded under the
main body of the statute but is included by a separate
amendment. 3 ' In addition, Title VII covers individual employees
in their capacity as agents of the employer.21 2 Covered employees
include all paid workers who are not independent contractors,
except military personnel.233  Finally, Title VII addresses
employers who do business outside of the United States with
234
respect to employees who are U.S. citizens.
Title VII prohibits two types of discrimination: intentional
discrimination, known as disparate treatment, and unintentional
discrimination, known as disparate impact. Because the courts use
a separate framework of analysis including burdens of proof and
employer defenses for the two types of discrimination, this
Comment will discuss them separately.235
2. Disparate Treatment
A disparate treatment claim under Title VII focuses on the
employer's intent. 23  The plaintiff's claim under a disparate
treatment theory is that the employer intentionally treated her
differently because of her sex. Title VII also encompasses sex
"plus" discrimination that occurs when an employer restricts
employment opportunities for specific classes of women, such as
those with very young children.2" The plaintiff may prove
disparate treatment by direct evidence, such as statements of
229 See id. § 2000e(b).
230 See id.
23 See id.
232 See id.
233 See id. § 2000e(f), 
-16(a).
234 See id. Title VII does not require an employer who employs American citizens
in a business outside of the United States to engage in any practices that would violate
the laws of the host country. See id. §2000e- 1(b).
235 See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 102, § 3.8.
236 See id. §3.6.
237 See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
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238bigotry accompanying a negative employment decision, or by
circumstantial evidence in which an inference of discriminatory
intent arises from an employer's actions.239 Furthermore, in Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins24° the Supreme Court held that Section
703's language prohibiting employment practices "because of' sex
means that employers will be liable under Title VII if they make
decisions based on a mixture of legitimate and illegitimate
considerations. 4' These cases are known as mixed motive cases.
Because direct evidence of discriminatory animus is not
always available, the Supreme Court has established an elaborate
system for the burdens of proof and production 24 in disparate
treatment cases with circumstantial evidence of discrimination. 24
In order to establish a prima facie case of intentional
discrimination, a complainant must generally satisfy four
requirements: (1) she is in a protected class; (2) she was qualified
and applied for the job; (3) she was rejected despite her
qualifications; and (4) the position remained open and the
employer continued the search.244 Because the facts will vary in
Title VII cases, the prima facie proof may also vary to
accommodate specific situations. Once the plaintiff establishes a
238 An example of direct evidence of discrimination in Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) were comments made by partners in plaintiff's evaluation
for partnership, suggesting that she needed a course in charm school. See id. at 256.
239 St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993) provides an example of
indirect evidence. In Hicks, plaintiff presented evidence that prior to personnel changes
he had a satisfactory employment record but soon after the change his new supervisor
singled him out and disciplined him for infractions of the same or lesser degree that co-
workers had also committed and manufactured a verbal confrontation that resulted in his
dismissal. See id. at 504-08.
240 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
24 See id. at 241.
242 See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). In
Burdine, the Court distinguished between the burden of proof or persuasion and the
burden of production. See id. "The ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that
the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with
the plaintiff." Id. at 253. The burden of production refers to the employer's burden of
producing admissible evidence to rebut a prima facie case of discrimination. See id. at
255.
243 See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 102, § 3.8.
244 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
245 See id. Note that Title VII encompasses a broad range of employer practices that
[Vol. 25
1999] SEX DISCRIMINATION COMPARISON
prima facie case of intentional discrimination, she has established
24
a rebuttable presumption of discrimination. 46The burden of
production shifts to the employer to present evidence that the
employer took the action for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory247
reason. 2 The employer's presentation of a legitimate non-
discriminatory reason for its action destroys the presumption of
discrimination. Conversely, if an employer does not articulate a
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the action it took then
the employee wins. If the employer does meet its burden of
production, the employee may still prevail if she can show that the
employer's proffered reason was actually a pretext for
249discrimination. In St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks,"5 the Court
concluded that even if the plaintiff proves pretext, she will not
automatically win the case.25' The Court held that a finding of
pretext merely permits rather than compels the trier of fact to find
in plaintiffs favor.252
In mixed motive cases, the analysis differs from that set out by
the Supreme Court in simple disparate treatment cases. The Civil
Rights Act of 1991 amended Title VII, which now provides that if
affect employment. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). The courts have modified the original
formula established under McDonnell Douglas for claims under Title VII other than race
discrimination. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 102, §3.8.
246 See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253-54.
247 See id. at 254.
248 See id. at 255.
249 See id. at 253-54.
250 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
25 See id. at 511.
252 See id. In two recent cases, the D.C. Circuit and the Fourth Circuit have
diverged in their interpretations of the Supreme Court's holding in Hicks. In Aka v.
Washington Hospital Center, 156 F.3d 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1998), the D.C. Circuit rejected
any reading of Hicks that would routinely require the plaintiff to prove evidence over and
above rebutting the defendant's proffered reason. See id. The D.C. Circuit also
concluded that the fact finder's rejection of a defendant's proffered reason was entitled
to considerable weight. See id. Compare this reading of Hicks, to the Fourth Circuit in
Vaughan v. MetraHealth Cos., Inc., 145 F.3d 197 (4th Cir. 1998). The Vaughan court
concluded that for a fact finder to find intentional discrimination, the plaintiff's evidence
of pretext had to provide a "factual basis for the ultimate finding of discrimination." Id.
at 201. The Fourth Circuit emphasized that finding an employer's purported reason
unbelievable carries a different and lesser burden than finding the employer's reason to
be based on unlawful discrimination. See id. (citing Hicks, 509 U.S. at 514-15).
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a plaintiff persuades the trier of fact that sex, race, color, or
religion was a motivating factor in the employer's challenged
253decision, then Title VII liability attaches. If the employer proves
by a preponderance of evidence that it would have made the same
decision regardless of the impermissible factor, the plaintiff is
limited to declaratory relief, certain injunctive relief, and
attorney's fees and costs. 254 The court may not award damages or
require the employer to hire, reinstate, or promote the plaintiff.
255
Employers may defeat Title VII liability for disparate
treatment cases by proving that their actions fall within one of
several affirmative defenses provided in the statute. The key
defense is the bona fide occupational qualification defense
256(BFOQ). Under this defense, an employer may intentionally
discriminate on the basis of sex257 if sex is "a bona fide
qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that
particular business. 258  The Supreme Court has interpreted the
BFOQ defense narrowly; in UAW v. Johnson Controls, the Court
held that to qualify as a legitimate BFOQ, sex must be "an
objective, verifiable requirement and must concern job-related
skills and aptitudes." 6 ° In addition, the Court emphasized that the
BFOQ must relate to the "essence ' 26' or "central mission ' 26 2 of the
enterprise or business.
The BFOQ exemption has been used in three major contexts.
The first context is for the purpose of authenticity. The Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) guidelines state
that "[w]here it is necessary for the purpose of authenticity or
genuineness, the Commission will consider sex to be a bona fide
253 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
254 See id.
255 See id.
256 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e).
257 Title VII permits a BFOQ on the basis of sex, religion, or national origin. See id.
Race or color may never be the basis for a BFOQ. See id.
258 Id.
259 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
260 Id. at 201.
261 Id. at 203 (citing Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333 (1977)).
262 Id. (citing Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 413 (1985)).
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occupational qualification, e.g., an actor or actress. 2 63 The second
context is one in which a customer preference for a specific sex is
related to personal privacy and modesty. For instance, in Healy v.
Southwood Psychiatric Hospital,64 the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals found that a policy of requiring at minimum one staff
member of each sex to be available for patients is reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of the particular business. The
third context is a BFOQ based on safety to third parties. The
Court has stressed that a safety BFOQ is permissible only under
narrow circumstances."' In Dothard v. Rawlinson, the Court
permitted an employer to hire only male prison guards in the
contact areas of a maximum-security male prison.267 The Supreme
Court reasoned that female guards would more likely be targets of
assault, which could create real risks of safety to others if violence
broke out.26 Thus, the Court required a high correlation between
sex and the ability to maintain prison safety. Since Dothard,
however, efforts to exclude women from institutional positions in
prisons have not been very successful. 269  Furthermore, the
Supreme Court has rejected employers' attempts to use sex as a
BFOQ based on their desire to protect women or their fetuses from
jobs that are dangerous. In Johnson Controls, the Court held that
an employer could not exclude fertile women from manufacturing
batteries because the environment was highly toxic to fetuses.27 °
The Court stressed that unconceived fetuses are neither customers
nor parties whose safety is of the "essence" to the business of
211battery making.
In addition to the statutorily created affirmative defenses in
Title VII, the Supreme Court has recognized that a valid
affirmative action program may defeat a claim of disparate
263 See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(2) (1998).
264 78 F.3d 128, 133 (3d Cir. 1996).
265 See Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 203-04.
266 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
267 See id.
268 See id. at 336.
269 See FRIEDMAN AND STRICKLER, supra note 103, at 201.
270 See Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 206.
271 Id. at 203-04.
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272treatment. In United Steelworkers v. Weber,273 the Court held
that Title VII permits voluntary affirmative efforts to remedy past
patterns of discrimination. Subsequently in Johnson v.
Transportation Agency, 75  the Court further outlined the
permissible boundaries of a voluntary affirmative action plan. In
this case, the employer promoted a woman to a position as a road• 276
dispatcher pursuant to an affirmative action plan. Although the
woman's overall job ratings were adequate for her promotion, they
were slightly lower than those of the male plaintiff.2 7 In holding
the employer's decision was consistent with Title VII, the Court
concluded that the employer's affirmative action plan was valid
under the criteria outlined in Weber. Specifically, the
affirmative action plan was designed to eliminate workforce
imbalances in traditionally segregated job categories, did not
unduly infringe upon the rights of male workers, and was intended
to attain, not maintain, a balanced workforce.279
3. Disparate Impact
In the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress codified in section
703(k) the disparate impact model of discrimination. Disparate
impact theory imposes employer liability for a facially neutral
policy that disproportionately disadvantages a protected category
of employees.2 80 The seminal disparate impact case is Griggs v.
Duke Power Company.28' In Griggs the Court held that an
employer's requirement of a high school diploma or a specific
score on an aptitude test in order to be hired or transferred to a
higher level job had a disproportionate impact on African-
272 See United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
273443 U.S. 193 (1979).
274 See id. at 209.
275 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
276 See id. at 634.
277See id. at 623-24.
278 See id. at 631-42.
279 See id. at 637-39.
280 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A).
281 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Note that in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 that amended
Title VII, Congress codified the disparate impact analysis set forth in Griggs. See Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
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Americans.282
In the 1991 amendments to Title VII, Congress codified the
burden of proof required for claims asserted under disparate
impact theory.283 The prima facie case for disparate impact theory
requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that a particular employment
practice causes a disparate impact If the complainant can show
the court that the challenged practice cannot be analyzed standing
alone, the decision-making process as a whole may be analyzed.285
In addition, the Court has held that subjective employment criteria
could be subject to a disproportionate impact claim.286 Typically,
the plaintiff proves her case using statistical evidence of the
287impact on the protected group disadvantaged by the practice.
The employer may rebut the prima facie case by proving that the
challenged practice is job-related and consistent with business
necessity. 288  The scope of business necessity remains unclear
because the circuits vary widely on what kind of showing the
employer must make in order to satisfy the business necessity
defense.28 9 For instance, in Robinson v. Lorillard Corp.29° the
Fourth Circuit stated that the test was whether there was an
282 See Griggs, 410 U.S. at 431.
283 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A).
284 See id.
285 See id. Congress enacted this provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 partly in
response to Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989). See Civil Rights
Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). In Wards Cove, the
Supreme Court held that a plaintiff must isolate and identify the specific employment
practice that resulted in the disproportionate impact on the protected group. See 490 U.S.
at 656.
286 See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 990 (1988).
287 The rule of thumb as to the threshold of disproportionate effect is the four-fifths
rule. In general, a selection rate for members of a protected class of less than eighty
percent of the rate for the highest scoring group establishes a prima facie case of
discrimination under the disparate impact theory. See FRIEDMAN AND STRICKLER, supra
note 103, at 235.
288 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(2).
289 The Civil Rights Act of 1991 did not provide courts with assistance in
determining what standard to apply for the business necessity defense. See FRIEDMAN
AND STRICKLER, supra note 103, at 266-67.
290 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1971).
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"overriding legitimate business purpose., 291 In contrast, the Eighth
Circuit in Nolting v. Yellow Freight System, Inc.292 concluded that
an employee evaluation system satisfied the business necessity
defense because it "significantly served" the interest in production
quantity.293 If the employer proves that the challenged practice is
job-related and a business necessity, the plaintiff may still prevail
if she proves that the employer "refuses to adopt . . . [an]
alternative employment practice" that serves the same purpose
without the discriminatory impact. 94
Section 703(h) of Title VII also provides a defense to liability
if the employer's practice or action is taken "pursuant to a bona
fide seniority or merit system., 295  Thus, without discriminatory
intent a seniority system that has discriminatory consequences for
a protected group does not violate Title VII.
29 6
4. Pregnancy Discrimination
Section 701(k) of Title VII specifically covers discrimination
based on "pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions. 297
Congress passed the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA)
as an amendment to Title VII.29' Employers must treat pregnant
employees like all other employees unless it can prove a BFOQ,
for disparate treatment, or business necessity defense, for disparate
impact. For instance in Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock
Co. V. EEOC,29 9 the Court held that an employer's health care
insurance policy covering hospitalization for all conditions except
those associated with pregnancy violated the PDA.3°°
291 Id. at 798.
292 799 F.2d 1192 (8th Cir. 1986).
293 Id. at 1198.
294 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii).
295 Id. § 2000e-2(h).
296 See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
297 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
298 The PDA was a response to the Supreme Court's ruling in General Electric Co.
v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) holding that Title VII did not prohibit an employer
disability plan that covered all disabilities except those associated with or arising from
pregnancy.
299 462 U.S. 669 (1983).
'0o See id.
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Under the PDA, employers must treat physical limitations
occasioned by pregnancy equally with disabilities of non-pregnant
workers. In Troupe v. May Department Stores Co.,3°1 the Seventh
Circuit held that the PDA does not require an employer to treat a
pregnant employee whose morning sickness causes chronic
tardiness more favorably than a non-pregnant employee who is
chronically late for work for a different health reason. Although
employers may not treat pregnant workers less favorably than non-
pregnant workers, the Supreme Court held in California Federal
Savings and Loan Association v. Guerra°3 that employers may
afford preferential treatment to pregnant workers without running
afoul of Title VII. 4
Disparate impact claims have also been recognized under the
PDA. The EEOC has ruled that an employer who refused to allow
pregnant women a reasonable leave of absence beyond the two-
week sick policy violated the PDA unless the employer could
demonstrate business necessity.05  Likewise in EEOC v.
Warshawsky & Co.,3°6 the district court found that an employer's
policy that prohibited all employees from taking any paid sick
leave during the first year of employment violated Title VII
because it resulted in a disparate impact on pregnant first-year
employees and the employer did not prove a business necessity.3 °7
5. Remedies
Title VII remedies can include equitable relief such as
reinstatement of back pay, seniority credit, affirmative action,
other types of affirmative orders, and attorneys' costs and fees.308
30 20 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 1994).
302 See id. at 737.
303 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
304 See id. at 289 (finding that the legislative history of the PDA was intended to
guarantee women the right to participate fully in the workforce without having to
sacrifice their family life).
305 See FRIEDMAN AND STRICKLER, supra note 103, at 423 (citing EEOC Dec. No.
74-112, 19 FEP Cases 1817 (April 15, 1974)).
306 768 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
307 See id. at 655.
308 See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 102, § 3.27. See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (outlining
the enforcement provisions of Title VII).
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In addition, if the court finds unlawful intentional discrimination,
the court may award a prevailing plaintiff compensatory and
punitive damages.3°9 The sum of the compensatory and punitive
damages is limited based on the employer's size."O
B. EU Law
1. Equal Treatment Directive: Generally
Unlike the principle of equal pay embodied in Article 119,
equal treatment between the sexes in general working conditions is
not expressly stated in the EEC Treaty. Because the ECJ did not
construe Article 119 broadly enough to require equal treatment, "
the EU legislative bodies enacted the Equal Treatment Directive312
to provide sex-discrimination protection in the workplace. Article
2(1) of the Equal Treatment Directive defines equal treatment
broadly to require that "there shall be no discrimination
whatsoever on the grounds of sex either directly or indirectly by
reference to marital or family status." '313 The Directive prohibits
both direct and indirect discrimination. These concepts should be
interpreted in the same manner as in the area of equal pay. 14 The
principle of equal treatment applies to conditions of access to
employment including selection criteria, all levels of occupational
hierarchy, all types of vocational guidance and training, conditions
covering dismissal, and some aspects of social security.313
For instance, in Kording v. Senator fur Finanzen,3 16 the ECJ
held that Article 3(1) precluded a measure that lengthened the time
requirement in the case of part-time workers for an exemption
309 See 42 U.S.C. § 198 1a(b)(I)-(3). If a complaining party seeks compensatory or
punitive damages the party may demand a jury trial. See 42 U.S.C. § 198 1a(c)(1).
310 See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3).
311 See Case 149/77, Defrenne v. Societe Anonyome Beige de Navigation Aerienne
Sabenna, 1978 E.C.R. 1365 (holding that Article 119 did not prohibit discriminatory
working conditions) (known as Defrenne III).
312 Council Directive 76/207, 1976 O.J. (L 39) 40 [hereinafter Equal Treatment
Directive].
313 Id. art. 2(1).
314 See BARNARD, supra note 8, § 4.56.
315 See Equal Treatment Directive, supra note 312, arts. 3-5.
316 Case C-100/95, 1997 E.C.R. 1-5289.
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from passing a qualifying exam to practice as a tax adviser.317
Individuals were exempt from passing a qualifying exam if they
had worked as an executive class employee of the revenue
administration for at least fifteen years.318 For applicants who had
worked part-time, the hours worked would be taken into account
only on a pro rata basis."' Thus, the part-time executive grade
employees, 92.4% of whom were women, had to work several
years longer than full-time employees.3 20 The plaintiff maintained
that the variety of tasks and quality of work of part-time
employees was comparable to full-time employees and that the
only difference was in volume.32' The ECJ held that in situations
where part-time employees who are predominately women are
treated less favorably than full-time workers, the measure is
contrary to Article 3(1) unless objectively justified on factors
322
unrelated to sex.
2. Direct Effect
If Member States have correctly implemented the Directive,
the plaintiff need only rely on national law. 32' Even if the
Directive has not been correctly implemented, the ECJ has held
that the principle of equal treatment laid down in Article 2(1) and
as applied as to the various conditions of employment set out in
Articles 3,4, and 5 is directly effective.3 24 The Directive is directly
effective against the Member State, and specifically to bodies that
are subject to the authority of the state or that have powers beyond
317 See id. at 1-5297.
318 See id. at 1-5294.
319 See id. at 1-5296.
320 See id. at 1-5298.
321 See id. at 1-5298.
322 For a discussion of objective justification as an employer's defense to an indirect
discrimination claim see supra notes 182-91 and accompanying text.
323 See BARNARD, supra note 8, § 4.59.
324 See Case 152/84, Marshall (No. 1) v. Southampton-South West Hampshire Area
Health Authority, 1986 E.C.R. 723 (holding the Equal Treatment Directive is directly
effective as applied to conditions governing dismissal referred to in Article 5(1)); Case
222/84, Johnston v. R.V.C., 1986 E.C.R. 1651 (ruling the Equal Treatment Directive is
directly effective as applied to conditions governing access to jobs and vocational
training referred to in Articles 3(1) and 4(1)).
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325those normally applicable between private individuals. The
ECJ, however, in Dekker E.J.P. v. Stichting Vorningscentrum voor
Jong Volwassenen (VJV-centrum) Plus326 held that a private
employer was bound to comply with the provisions of the
Directive that had not yet been fully implemented by the Dutch
government.1
21
Articles 3, 4, and 5 also require Member States to invalidate
any laws, regulations or administrative provisions that are contrary
to the principle of equal treatment.3 " Furthermore, these Articles
obligate Member States to ensure that any discriminatory
provisions in collective agreements, individual employment
contracts, internal rules of businesses, or rules governing
occupations and professions are either voided or amended.
3 29
Consequently, individuals who have been discriminated against
but are not employed by the State have grounds to bring an action
against the Member State for its failure to fulfill these
obligations.33 °
3. Remedies
Article 6 of the Equal Treatment Directive requires Member
States to enact laws enabling individuals to pursue their claims by
325 See BARNARD, supra note 8, § 4.59 (citing Case C-188/89, Foster v. British Gas,
1990 E.C.R. 1-3313).
326 Case C-177/88, 1990 E.C.R. 1-3941.
327 See id. The doctrine of indirect effects, or the interpretation mechanism, is
derived from the duty of loyalty from Member States required by Article 5 of the EC
Treaty. See BARNARD, supra note 8, § 1.66. The ECJ has found that the obligation
contained in Article 5 also binds national courts, obliging them to interpret national law
with Community law as a guide. See id. Moreover, this obligation is not limited to the
situation in which national law has been passed to implement an EU provision. See id.
Rather, when applying national law, regardless of whether the law had been enacted
before or after the Directive, the national court must interpret its law in light of the
wording and purpose in order to achieve the goal of the Directive. See Case C-106/89,
Marleasing SA v. La Commercial International de Alimentacion SA, 1990 E.C.R. 1-
4135.
328 See Equal Treatment Directive, supra note 312, arts. 3-5.
329 See id.
330 See BARNARD, supra note 8, § 4.60 (citing Case C-6 and C-9/90, Francovich v.
Italian Republic, 1991 E.C.R. 1-5357).
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judicial process."' In addition, Article 6 does not mandate specific
sanctions but allows Member States the discretion to design
solutions.332 The ECJ, though, has curbed Member States'
discretion in the area of sanctions. The ECJ stated that the
obligation in Article 6 requiring Member States to provide a
judicial process for individuals who have an equal treatment claim
implies that the Member States' sanctions must be sufficiently
effective to achieve the Directive's purpose.333 Thus, Member
States must take measures to restore equality by requiring that
victims be reinstated or awarded monetary compensation for the
loss and damages they incurred.334  Sanctions established by the
Member States must be adequate in relation to the damage and
serve a deterrent to the employer. 35 In Marshall II, the ECJ held
that although an upper limit on compensation is not per se
unlawful, an upper limit on the amount of compensation and the
exclusion of interest did not meet the purpose of the Directive in
that case.:' Similarly, the ECJ has held that the restriction of
compensation to traveling expenses incurred did not meet the
requirements of Article 6."' Notably, in light of the Court's
decision in Marshall II that Article 5 and Article 6 in combination
are directly effective, Article 6 read in conjunction with Article 3
and Article 4 should also be directly effective.338
4. Exceptions
The Equal Treatment Directive specifies exceptions (1) where
sex is a determining factor; (2) where women need protection,
particularly with regards to pregnancy and maternity; or (3) where
the Member State has instituted positive action programs.33 9 These
331 See Equal Treatment Directive, supra note 312, art. 6.
332 See id.
333 See Case 271/91, Marshall v. Southampton-South West Hampshire Area Health
Authority, 1993 E.C.R. 1-4367 [hereinafter Marshall II].
334 See id.
311 See id.
336 See id.
311 See Case 14/83, Von Colson and Kamann v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, 1984
E.C.R. 1891; Case 79/83 Harz v. Deutsche Tradax, 1984 E.C.R. 1921.
338 See BARNARD, supra note 8, § 4.79.
339 See Equal Treatment Directive, supra note 312, art. 2.
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exceptions are derogations from an individual right set out in the
Directive.3 40  Consequently, they are subject to the principle of
proportionality and must be interpreted strictly and reviewed
regularly.4 In addition to the three exceptions enumerated in the
Directive, other exceptions have been implied.3 4' For instance
indirect discrimination, although expressly forbidden by the
Directive, may be justified if it is demonstrated that the
discrimination is the result of some policy that reflects a "real
need" of an employer or a very important consideration of the
social policy of the Member State.
3 43
5. Determining Factor
Article 2(2) states that the Member State may "exclude from
its field of application those occupational activities and, where
appropriate, the training leading thereto, for which, by reason of
the nature or the context in which they are carried out, the sex of
the worker constitutes a determining factor."344  The Directive
requires the Member States to compile a list of occupations and
activities excluded under this exception and submit it to the
Commission for verification.345 In Commission v. UK of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland,46 the UK argued that the
determining factor exception applied in three situations: (1)
employment in a private household; (2) employment of five or
fewer persons; or (3) the profession of midwife.347 The ECJ held
that although sex may be a determining factor in certain types of
340 See BARNARD, supra note 8, § 4.61.
341 See id. (citing Case 222/84, Johnson v. RUC, 1986 E.C.R. 1651 (rejecting the
United Kingdom's reservation to the principle of equal treatment in regard to measures
taken based on public safety)).
342 See Jill Andrews, Comment, National and International Sources of Women's
Right to Equal Employment Opportunities: Equality in Law Versus Equality in Fact, 14
J. INT'L L. Bus. 413, 423 (1994).
141 See id. (citing Note, Presentation of the Third Comparative Labor Law
Roundtable: Unlawful Discrimination in Employment, 20 GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 1, 20
(1990)).
344 Equal Treatment Directive, supra note 312, art. 2.
311 See id. art. 9(2).
346 Case 165/82, 1983 E.C.R. 3431.
... See id. at 3438-39.
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private household employment, it is not so in all situations, and
therefore the exception was overly broad.34  The ECJ also found
that the UK had not demonstrated that in a business of five or
fewer employees that sex would be a determining factor as to
activities or their context.14 Finally, the ECJ found that sex may
be a necessary factor in the relationship between midwife and
patient due to personal sensitivities.350
In Johnston v. Chief Constable of Royal Ulster,
Constabulary,"' however, the ECJ held that in certain law
enforcement activities in Northern Ireland involving the use of
fire-arms, the sex of the police officer was a determining factor.352
The ECJ accepted that because of the dangerous conditions in
Northern Ireland, armed female police officers might face
additional risks of being targets of assassination.353 In addition
their firearms may more easily fall into the hands of terrorists.
35 4
The possibility of these additional risks would be contrary to
public safety.5
Another significant case addressing sex as a determining factor
is Commission v. French Republic.356 Although the Commission
did not dispute that prison guards below the rank of governor
could be hired on the basis of sex, it argued that the supervisory
position of governor was administrative in nature and thus was not
exempt from the principle of equal treatment.357 The ECJ,
however, disagreed with the Commission. The ECJ held that
because the French government wanted to hire from the prison
guard pool and that this experience was necessary for proper
prison administration, sex could be a determining factor for the
348 See id. at 3348.
... See id.
350 See id.
311 Case 222/84, 1986 E.C.R. 1651.
352 See id. at 1687.
311 See id.
114 See id. at 1686.
I" See id. at 1687.
356 Case 318/86, 1988 E.C.R. 3559.
317 See id. at 3573.
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governor position.15 The French government also argued that five
categories of national police supervisor could be selected using
sex as a criterion and attempted to justify separate recruitment.359
The court rejected this claim and concluded that exceptions could
only relate to specific activities and had to be sufficiently
transparent.36° Transparency would enable the Commission to
supervise the situation so that the exceptions could be adapted to
future social developments. Because objective criteria did not
govern the fixed percentages of posts to be filled by each sex, the
Commission could not properly supervise the situation.36'
Consequently, the ECJ ruled that the system of separate
recruitment was not exempt from the principle of equal
treatment.
362
6. Protection of Women
Article 2(3) permits an exception from the principle of equal
treatment to protect women "particularly as regards pregnancy and
maternity. 363 In Johnston,36 the ECJ stated that this exception was
intended to protect the biological condition of pregnancy and the
relationship between mother and child. 6 ' The ECJ fleshed out this
issue in Ulrich Hofinann v. Barmer Ersatszasse. In this case, a
father took unpaid paternity leave to look after his newborn child
when the mother returned to work after the obligatory period of
maternity leave.367  The ECJ refused the father's claim to the
Member State's maternity allowance and concluded that the Equal
Treatment Directive did not require Member States to grant leave
358 See id.
"I See id. at 3580.
360 See id. at 3581.
361 See id. at 3582.
362 See id.
363 Equal Treatment Directive, supra note 312, art. 2(3).
36 Case 222/84, Johnston v. Chief Constable of Royal Ulster, Constabulary, 1986
E.C.R. 1651.
365 See id. at 1688.
366 Case 184/83, 1984 E.C.R. 3047.
367 See id. at 3050.
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to fathers, even if the parents decide he will remain home."'
Because the exception aims to protect women in connection with
the effects of pregnancy and motherhood, leave may be reserved
for women to offset the disadvantages they face as to retention of
employment or pressures to return to work prematurely.36 9
Although the protection-of-women exception to the equal
treatment provision may justify special protection of women in
connection with pregnancy and motherhood, a total exclusion of
women from an occupation such as police work cannot be
justified. 7 For instance, in Stoeckel v. French Republic37' the ECJ
declared unlawful a provision of the French Labor Code excluding
women from night work, because the risks were common to men
and women."' The ECJ did point out, however, that measures
designed solely to protect the mother and child during and
immediately following pregnancy could fall within the derogation
of Article 2(3).13
7. Positive Action
Article 2(4) permits Member States to take measures to
promote equal opportunity for men and women by removing
barriers facing women. 374 These measures, referred to as "positive
action," are analogous to what the United States labels
"affirmative action" programs. Positive action programs seek to
remedy situations that result in or promote inequalities in the
workplace and are constructed to encourage underrepresented
groups to achieve a position in which they are competitive forjobs. 375
368 See id. at 3077.
369 See id. at 3075.
370 See BARNARD, supra note 8, § 4.68.
371 Case C-345/89, 1991 E.C.R. 1-4047.
372 See id. at 1-4058, 1-4061.
373 See id. at 1-4057-58.
371 See Equal Treatment Directive, supra note 312, art. 2(4). Article 2(4) states
"this Directive shall be without prejudice to measures to promote equal opportunity for
men and women, in particular by removing existing inequalities which affect women's
opportunities." Id.
171 See BARNARD, supra note 8, § 4.71.
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In Commission v. French Republic,376 the ECJ concluded that
Article 2(4) was constructed to allow measures that are
discriminatory in appearance and are intended to ameliorate or
remove situations of inequality that exist because of social
reality.377 At the same time, the ECJ ruled that generalized special
rights for women in collective agreement were outside the scope
of the Article 2(4) exception.37
Two recent cases have been pivotal in establishing the
boundaries of positive action. The first of these cases is Kalanke
v. Freie Hansestadt Bremen.379 The ECJ's controversial decision
in Kalanke prohibited the automatic nature of quotas. 38 The case
involved an employment policy that required if two candidates for
the same promotion were equally qualified, the woman would
automatically be given priority in areas where women were
underrepresented.38 ' Underrepresentation was deemed to exist
when women composed less than half of the staff.382 The ECJ
refined its position on positive action in Hellmut Marschal v. Land
Nordrhein Westfalen.383 In Hellmut, the ECJ concluded that the
positive action policy similar to that in Kalanke was
impermissible!" A savings clause distinguished Kalanke,
providing that equally qualified female candidates were given
priority unless reasons specific to the opposing male candidate
tilted the balance in his favor. The ECJ emphasized that even
when male and female candidates are equally qualified, the male
candidates tend to be promoted because of "prejudices and
stereotypes concerning the role and capacities of women in
working life."38 For these reasons the ECJ concluded that equal
qualifications of male and female candidates do not translate into
376 Case 312/86, 1988 E.C.R. 6332.
177 See id. at 6336-37.
378 See id.
379 Case C-450/93, 1995 E.C.R. 1-3051.
380 See BLANPAIN AND ENGELS, supra note 32, at 264.
381 See Case C-450/93, 1995 E.C.R. 1-3051, 3054.
382 See id. at 3055.
383 Case C-409/95, 1997 E.C.R. 1-6363.
384 See id. at 6392.
315 Id. at 6391.
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equal opportunity for promotion.'
8. Employer Defenses
Employer defenses under the Equal Treatment Directive are
analogous to those articulated by the ECJ for the Equal PayD. .• 387
Directive. In the context of direct discrimination the orthodox
position is that no defense exists for employers. Yet for claims
of indirect discrimination, the discriminatory consequences may
be permissible where the employer justifies its action based on
objective economic factors not related to discrimination based on
389
sex.
9. Pregnancy Discrimination
The ECJ has held that an employer's refusal to hire or
dismissal of a woman on the basis of pregnancy constitutes direct
- • 390
sex discrimination contrary to the Equal Treatment Directive.
The ECJ does not require a male comparator suffering from a
similar problem; rather the ECJ has held that since only women
can become pregnant, discrimination on the basis of pregnancy is
prima facie direct discrimination. 9 ' In more complex dismissal
cases such as Webb v. EMO Air Cargo Limited,392 the ECJ has also
invalidated an employer's less favorable treatment of pregnant
women.393 In Webb, the plaintiff was appointed to replace another
employee who was about to take maternity leave and also to
386 See id.
387 For an examination of employer defenses for direct and indirect discrimination
see supra notes 182-91 and accompanying text.
388 See BARNARD, supra note 8, § 4.32.
389 See Case 170/84, Bilka-Kaufhaus v. Weber von Hartz, 1986 E.C.R. 1607.
390 See Case C-177/88, Deckker v. VJV Centrum, 1990 E.C.R. 1-3941 (holding that
refusal to hire a women based on her pregnancy constituted direct discrimination on the
basis of sex); Case C-179/88, Hertz v. Dansk Abejdsgiverforening, 1990 E.C.R. 1-3979
(ruling that the dismissal of a female worker on account of pregnancy was direct
discrimination based on sex).
391 See, e.g., Case C-32/93, Webb v. EMO Air Cargo Limited, 1994 E.C.R. 1-3567
(finding that pregnancy is not comparable to a pathological condition).
392 Case C-32/93, 1994 E.C.R. 1-3567.
'9' See id. at 1-3589.
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continue once the other employee retumed. 94  Shortly after
beginning the job, the plaintiff told the employer she was
pregnant.•95  The employer dismissed the plaintiff ostensibly
because she would be unavailable to work during the period she
for which she was needed.3 96 The ECJ rejected the employers'
justification and held that if an employer hires a woman for an
indefinite period, her pregnancy cannot be used to justify her
dismissal because she would be unable to fulfill an essential aspect
of her employment, including replacing another employee who is
on maternity leave.397
The ECJ has not granted women who suffer from pregnancy
complications complete protection. In Forbund i Danmark v.
Dansk Abejdsgiverforening,"' the ECJ ruled that an employer may
not dismiss a woman on the basis of absences during the
pregnancy and maternity leave time period.39 9 But an employer
may dismiss a woman based on absences after the maternity leave
time period even if the absences are the result of pregnancy related
illness. 4°°
Because pregnancy based discrimination is direct
discrimination, the orthodox view is that no defense exists for
employers. Direct discrimination is permissible, however, if the
employer's actions fall within the scope of Article 2(3) derogation
regarding the protection of women vis-A-vis pregnancy and
maternity. For instance, national law may prohibit pregnant
women from working a nighttime shift.40' The employer cannot,
however, terminate a woman hired for an indefinite period because
national law temporarily precludes her from working the nighttime
402
shift during her pregnancy. Finally, an employer's actions are
394 See id. at 1-3571.
311 See id.
396 See id.
391 See id. at 1-3589.
398 See Case C-179/88, 1990 E.C.R. 1-3979.
399 See id. at 1-3999.
410 See id. at 1-4000.
401 See Case C-421/92, Habermann-Beltermann v. Abeiterwohlfarht,
Bezirksverband Ndb./Ofp. e. V., 1994 E.C.R. 1-1657, 1675.
402 See id. at 1-1677.
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permitted under the Equal Treatment Directive if they are not
discriminatory on the basis of sex but rather if an employee's
inability to work is the result of a pathological condition or non-
403
medical reasons.
In 1992, the EU enacted the Pregnant Workers Directive 404 to
provide protection for pregnant workers, those who have just
given birth, and those who are breastfeeding. 45 The Pregnant
Workers Directive establishes three main areas of protection.
First, pregnant employees may take time off without pay penalties
for prenatal medical exams.4 °6 Second, women are entitled to at• 407
least fourteen continuous weeks of maternity leave. Also the
woman's pay or an adequate allowance that is equivalent to sick
pay must be ensured. 4°' Third, employers may not dismiss women
from the beginning of their pregnancy through the end of their
maternity leave, barring exceptional circumstances unrelated to
their pregnancy. 4°9 Member States must provide a remedy for
pregnant workers who have been unlawfully terminated.4 °
The Directive also creates requirements to protect the health
and safety of pregnant employees. For instance, if certain risks are
present at the workplace an employer must notify the pregnant
employee and/or a worker's representatives and may have to
temporarily adjust working conditions or hours, or move the
woman to another job.441 If these options are not feasible, then the
a t412
pregnant employee must be allowed leave. Further, pregnant
and nursing women may not be required to perform duties that risk
403 See Case C-32/93, Webb v. EMO Air Cargo, 1994 E.C.R. 1-3567.
40 Council Directive 92/85/EEC 1992 O.J. (L348) I [hereinafter Pregnant Workers
Directive].
405 See id.
406 See id. art. 9.
407 See id. art. 8(1).
408 See id. art. 1 (2)(b), 11(4). Member States may make entitlement to maternity
pay conditional on the employee's fulfilling established statutory eligibility
requirements. See id.
409 See id. art. 10(1).
410 See id. art. 10(3).
411 See id. art. 4.
412 See id.
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exposure to certain agents and working conditions."3 Finally, the
Directive requires that the Members States provide a means for
414
women to pursue claims under the Directive by judicial process.
C. Practical Differences Between U.S. and EU Equal
Treatment Law
One of the most significant differences between U.S. and EU
law is the exemption in the Equal Treatment Directive for the
protection of women with regards to pregnancy. The Supreme
Court in Johnson Controls rejected an employer's attempt to use a
woman's condition as a fertile woman as a BFOQ to protect her
potential fetus from risks posed by manufacturing batteries.41'5 The
Court emphasized that "concern for women's existing or potential
offspring historically has been the excuse denying women equal
employment opportunities. '4 6  Furthermore, the Supreme Court
emphasized a woman's individual autonomy in making
employment and reproductive choices and concluded that it was
not the place of the courts or individual employers to interfere
with those decisions.47
In stark contrast, the Equal Treatment Directive itself provides
that an employer may directly discriminate on the basis of sex to
protect the woman's fetus.4 '8 The ECJ has limited the exemption.
Employers may not generally exclude women from positions that
have risks to both men and women such as night work.4 9 This
kind of general exclusion would be analogous to the exclusion of
all women of childbearing age that the employer in Johnson
Controls utilized. The Equal Treatment Directive would thus
allow employers to exclude women from risky work during
pregnancy and its aftermath.42° Under U.S. law, a fetal protection
413 See id. art. 6.
414 See id. art. 12. The similarity between Article 12 of the Pregnant Workers
Directive and the Article 6 of the Equal Treatment Directive implies that the caselaw
surrounding the latter will apply to the former. See BARNARD, supra note 8, § 4.106.
415 See UAW v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 206 (1991).
416 Id. at 211.
417 See id.
418 See Equal Treatment Directive, supra note 312, art. 2(3).
419 See Case C-345/89, Stoeckel v. French Republic, 1991 E.C.R. 1-4047,1-4048.
420 See id. at 1-4057-58.
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policy could expose an employer to Title VII liability.
U.S. and EU law differ in another fundamental area of
pregnancy discrimination. Under U.S. law, pregnancy is
theoretically analogous to the disability of a non-pregnant
employee. Employers must treat pregnant and non-pregnant
employees equally. Thus, the Seventh Circuit has held that the
PDA does not mandate that an employer treat a pregnant employee
with morning sickness more favorably in its tardy policy than any•1 4211
other employee who is disabled by an illness. Under EU law, in
contrast, pregnancy is not considered equivalent to a pathological
condition.422 EU law recognizes pregnancy and motherhood as
unique to women's biological and cultural experiences. The EU's
Pregnant Worker's Directive specifically establishes special
treatment for pregnant and breastfeeding employees. 423 Employers
must comply with various requirements including granting
pregnant employees time off without a pay penalty for prenatal
medical visits and mandatory fourteen weeks maternity leave.424
In addition the employer is responsible for notifying pregnant
women of hazardous working conditions and may be responsible
for adjusting working conditions or allowing her to take a leave of
absence. 25
V. Sexual Harassment
In the United States, sexual harassment has been recognized as
a form of sex discrimination and as such falls within the ambit of
Title VII. In the EU, however, sexual harassment claims have not
been incorporated into the Equal Treatment Directive in an
analogous manner. Sexual harassment is a recently recognized
form of sex discrimination that has profoundly affected behavior
in the workplace on the part of employees and employers. As a
significant new force, sexual harassment law warrants its own
section for examination. This section will first examine the
current state of sexual harassment law in the U.S. It will next
421 See Troupe v. May Dep't Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 1994).
422 See Case C-32/93, Webb v. EMO Cargo Ltd., 1994 E.C.R. 1-3567.
423 See Pregnant Workers Directive, supra note 404.
424 See id. art. 9.
425 See id. art. 5-6.
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present an overview of EU law and examine several of the varying
legal approaches to addressing sexual harassment in the workplace
that have been taken by the Member States. Finally, this section
will emphasize practical differences between U.S. and EU sexual
harassment law and the consequent effects on employer liability.
A. U.S. Sexual Harassment Law
Sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination actionable
under Title VII. Under Title VII, it is "an unlawful employment
practice for an employer ... to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin." '426 Two forms of sexual harassment
constitute discrimination "because of' one's sex: quid pro quo and
hostile working environment.427
Quid pro quo harassment describes a type of harassment in
which a supervisor implicitly or explicitly conditions a tangible
economic benefit on the receipt of sexual favors. 428 For a plaintiff
to establish a successful claim of quid pro quo harassment the
plaintiff must demonstrate that her refusal to submit to the
demands for sexual favors resulted in a tangible job detriment.429
Otherwise the harassment falls within the theory of hostile work
environment.43°  There exists, however, a distinction between
"refusal" cases in which the plaintiff must demonstrate a tangible
job detriment and "submission" cases in which the plaintiff does
not have this burden.43' In submission cases, "economic harm will
not be available to support the claim of an employee who submits
426 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l).
427 See McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1195 (4th
Cir. 1996).
428 See id.
429 See Burlington Industries, Inc., v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); see also Gary v.
Long, 59 F.3d 1391, 1396 (D.C. Cir. 1995) ("[A] supervisor's mere threat or promise of
job related harm or benefits in exchange for sexual favors does not constitute quid pro
quo harassment").
430 See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 754 ("Because Ellerth's claim involves only unfulfilled
threats, it should be categorized as a hostile work environment claim.").
431 See Jones v. Clinton, 990 F. Supp. 657, 670 (E.D. Ark. 1998) (emphasizing the
distinction between "submission" and "refusal" cases).
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to the supervisor's demands. 432
Hostile work environment harassment exists when a supervisor
or coworker creates a work climate sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter the conditions of employment so that a
reasonable person would perceive the workplace environment as
hostile or abusive.4 " The standard is subjective as well as
objective. The plaintiff must establish that she or he subjectively
perceived the behavior as abusive.434 In addition the harassment
must be "unwelcome ' 435 and make the plaintiff's job more difficult
to perform.4  The Supreme Court has held, however, that the
plaintiff does not have to prove that job performance actually
diminished or that plaintiff suffered psychological damage.437
Finally, the Supreme Court recently upheld a cause of action under
Title VII for same-sex harassment.
43 8
Applying the reasonable person standard remains one of the
major issues in hostile work environment cases. In Harris v.
Forklift Lift Systems, Inc., the Court left this issue open. The
Court held that whether the environment was hostile or abusive
should be determined by looking at the totality of the
circumstances. 43 9  The circuit courts disagree as to what the
reasonable person standard should be. Prior to the Court's ruling
in Harris, some lower courts had adopted a reasonable woman or
victim standard. °  In a post-Harris case, the Ninth Circuit
sustained a trial court's instructions that ordered jurors to
determine "whether the workplace [was] objectively hostile from
the perspective of a reasonable person with the same fundamental
432 Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773, 778 (2d Cir. 1994).
433 See Harris v. Forklift Sys. Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (citing Meritor Savings
Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)).
414 See id.
431 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68 ("[Tlhe gravamen of any sexual harassment claim is that
the alleged sexual advances were 'unwelcome."') (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1985)).
436 See Harris, 510 U.S. at 25 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
431 See id. at 22.
438 See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs. Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998). The Court
further held, "harassing conduct need not be motivated by sexual desire to support an
inference of discrimination on the basis of sex." Id. at 80.
439 See Harris, 523 U.S. at 23.
440 See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991).
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characteristics. Hostility must be measured based on the totality
of circumstances."44' The Ninth Circuit held the trial court's
instruction to be consistent with both Ellison v. Brady4 ' and
Harris.44' The Fifth Circuit has interpreted Harris as applying a
reasonable person standard significantly different from the Ninth
Circuit's. The Fifth Circuit has held that "[t]he test is an objective
one, not a standard of offense to a 'reasonable woman.' 4
In two recent cases Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth445 and
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,44 6 the Supreme Court clarified the
issue of employer liability in harassment cases. It emphasized that
the primary objective of Title VII was to avoid harm. 447 The Court
concluded that recognizing employers' affirmative obligation to
prevent sexual harassment and rewarding employers who make
reasonable efforts to fulfill their obligation would function to
implement the policy underlying Title VII.448 Consequently, the
Supreme Court held that an employer is vicariously liable to the
victimized employee for a hostile environment created by the acts
of a supervisor with immediate or higher authority over an
employee.49 If a supervisor's harassment results in a tangible
employment detriment such as discharge, demotion, or undesirable
reassignment, employers are strictly liable with no affirmative
defense available to them.45° If the plaintiff does not suffer a
tangible employment detriment the employer may assert an
affirmative defense. The affirmative defense has two necessary
elements: (1) the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent
and promptly correct sexual harassment, for instance, through an
44' Fuller v. City of Oakland, 47 F.3d 1522, 1527 (9th Cir. 1995).
442 924 F.2d at 879 (adopting a reasonable woman standard).
443 See Fuller, 47 F.3d at 1527.
44 DeAngelis v. El Paso Mun. Police Officers Ass'n, 51 F.3d 591, 594 (5th Cir.
1995).
445 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
446 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
447 See id. at 805-06 (citing Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418
(1975)).
48 See id.
449 See id. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. Ellerth and Faragher contain the
identical holdings and cite each other as sharing authority.
450 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 808; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
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anti-harassment policy and procedure; and (2) the plaintiff
unreasonably failed to take advantage of policy and procedures
provided by the employer."' In Faragher, the Court found that the
employer could not successfully establish an affirmative defense
by merely having an anti-harassment policy. 42 In this case, the
employer failed to effectively disseminate and implement the
policy and did not provide a procedure in which the employees
could bypass the harassing supervisors.453 Thus, the employer had
not exercised reasonable care to prevent the harassing conduct.
Because the affirmative defense articulated by the Court in
Faragher and Ellerth is grounded in the employer's duty of
"reasonable care," it denies an affirmative defense in a situation in
which the employer knew or should have know of the harassing
conduct and did not correct it.
Faragher and Ellerth specifically address cases that involve
harassment by supervisors of subordinate employees. Although
the Supreme Court has not heard a case involving the issue of co-
worker harassment under Title VII, the dicta in Ellerth indicates
an approval of lower courts' decisions that apply a "knew or
should have known" standard to determine vicarious liability of
the employer.4  The structuring of employer liability under
Ellerth and Faragher, however, is bound to have a spillover effect
455in peer harassment cases.
B. EU Sexual Harassment Law
1. Applicable Legislation
The Equal Treatment Directive does not expressly designate
456
sexual harassment as a form of sexual discrimination. Because
the Directive is not sufficiently specific, it does not require
Member States to implement national legislation that protects
451 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
452 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 808-09.
411 See id. at 808.
414 See Marley S. Weiss, The Supreme Court 1997-1998 Labor and Employment
Law Term (Part 1): The Sexual Harassment Decisions, in 14 LAB. LAW. 261, 307 (1998).
411 See id.
456 See Equal Treatment Directive, supra note 312.
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employees from sexual harassment.457  In 1987, an EU
Commission report found that although a considerable degree of
evidence demonstrated the serious consequences of sexual
harassment, most Member States did not have effective legal
remedies for a claim of sexual harassment. 8 Consequently the
Commission proposed that a Directive should be enacted dealing
specifically with protecting workers from sexual harassment. 9
Member States ignored the Commission's suggestion and in its
place the Council passed a non-binding Resolution on the Dignity
of Women and Men at Work.46°
The Council Resolution defines sexual harassment as "conduct
of a sexual nature, or other sex based conduct affecting the dignity
of women and men at work, including conduct of superiors and
colleagues. 46' The Council Resolution deems behavior
unacceptable if:
(a) such conduct is unwanted, unreasonable and offensive
to the recipient;
(b) a person's rejection of or submission to such conduct
on the part of employers or workers (including superiors or
colleagues) is used explicitly or implicitly as a basis for a
decision which affects that person's access to vocational
training, access to employment, promotion, salary, or any
other employment decisions; and/or
(c) such conduct creates an intimidating, hostile, or
462humiliating work environment for the recipient.
The Commission then passed the Recommendation on the
Protection of Dignity in the Workplace 41 that was approved by a
457 See Victoria Carter, Working on Dignity: EC Initiatives on Sexual Harassment in
the Workplace, 12 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 431, 441 (1992).
458 See BARNARD, supra note 8, § 4.81 (citing Rubenstein, THE DIGNITY OF WOMAN
AT WORK: A REPORT ON THE PROBLEM OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE MEMBER STATES
OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (1987)).
459 See id.
460 Council Resolution of 29 May 1990 on the Protection of the Dignity of Women
and Men at Work, 1990 O.J. (C 157) 3 [hereinafter Council Resolution].
461 Id. art. 1.
462 Id.
463 Commission Recommendation of 27 November 1991 on the Protection and
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Council Declaration' 64 in December 1991. The Commission
Recommendation defines the unacceptable conduct as set out in
the Council Resolution and directs the Member States to enact
465
measures to prevent sexual harassment.
The definition of sexual harassment embodied in the Council
Resolution and the Commission Recommendation defines sexual
harassment subjectively rather than objectively. 466 Thus the effect
of the harasser's conduct would not be evaluated by the reasonable
person standard but rather by examining how the conduct affected
that particular person.467 The intent or motivation of the harasser is
irrelevant in evaluating the conduct.
468
At the Council's request a Code of Practice accompanies the
Commission Recommendation. 469 The Code describes the various
forms that sexual harassment may take including physical conduct,
suggestive remarks, and displays of pornographic material. 4 10 It
also emphasizes that employers should take measures to prevent
sexual harassment.4 1 The Code encourages employers to issue a
clear sexual harassment policy, develop complaint and
investigation procedures, and train sexual harassment
counselors.7
The Council Resolution, the Commission Recommendation,
and the Code of Practice are not legally binding on the Member
States. 473 The ECJ, though, has held that Member State national
courts must take recommendations into consideration when
Dignity of Women and Men at Work, 1992 O.J. (L 49) 1 [hereinafter Commission
Recommendation].
41 Council Declaration of 19 December 1991 on the Implementation of the
Commission Recommendation on the Protection of the Dignity of Women and Men at
Work, Including the Code of Practice to Combat Sexual Harassment, 1992 O.J. (C 27) 1
[hereinafter Council Declaration].
465 See Commission Recommendation, supra note 463.
466 See BARNARD, supra note 8, § 4.83.
467 See id.
468 See id.
469 See Carter, supra note 457, at 442.
470 See Commission Recommendation, supra note 463.
471 See id.
472 See id.
471 See supra notes 42-50 for an explanation of the various types of EU legislation.
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deciding cases before them.474 This kind of consideration is
particularly pertinent when the Member States' courts are
interpreting national law passed to implement the policy set forth
in the recommendation. 475  The EU is currently considering
enacting a directive proscribing sexual harassment which would
have the same binding effects of the Equal Treatment Directive
and the Equal Pay Directive.476
2. Sexual Harassment and the Equal Treatment Directive
The Commission Recommendation states that sexual
harassment "may be in certain circumstances, contrary to the
principle of equal treatment within the meaning of Articles 3, 4,
and 5 of Council Directive 76/207/EEC." Incorporating sexual
harassment claims within the scope of the Equal Treatment
Directive would grant legally enforceable rights and remedies to
those who claim they are victims of sexual harassment.4 If
employers were faced with a claim of direct discrimination, they
would be vicariously and strictly liable for the conduct of the
harassed. 479 Furthermore, unless the ECJ would allow an employer
to raise an objective justification defense to direct discrimination
claims, the employer could only resort to the narrowly construed
derogations contained in the Equal Treatment Directive.48 °
Consequently, employers that have instituted the Code of Practice
suggestion have lost the Code defense that all reasonable
precautions were taken when faced with a direct discrimination
claim.48'
3. Member States Laws Against Sexual Harassment
Currently most Member States do not consider sexual
44 See Case C-322/88, Grimaldi v. Fonds des Maladies Professionelles, 1989
E.C.R. 4407.
471 See id.
476 See John C. Penn, Sexual Harassment: Proscriptive Policies of the European
Community, Ireland, and New Zealand, 6 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 139, 163 (1997).
177 Commission Recommendation, supra note 463.
478 See BARNARD, supra note 8, § 4.87.
411 See id.
480 See id.
481 See id.
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harassment to be within the scope of sex based discrimination
under the Equal Treatment Directive.482 Furthermore, no directive
exists to mandate Member States to adopt legislation proscribing
sexual harassment.483 In fact, levels of consciousness about sexual
harassment vary greatly among Member States as does the law.4
Spain and France have legislation that expressly prohibits sexual
harassment.4" The scope of this legislation is limited in two ways:
(1) the laws cover only supervisor-subordinate harassment, not
coworker harassment; and (2) the laws provide only fines and/or
imprisonment of the harasser but no compensation for the
victims. 486 In the United Kingdom and Ireland, the courts have
interpreted sexual harassment as within the ambit of sex
discrimination. Under the Sex Discrimination Act of 1975, the
UK courts have interpreted sexual harassment broadly to include
physical and verbal harassment, quid pro quo, and hostile working
487environment harassment. The Act creates strict employer
liability for harassment perpetrated by its employees and provides
victims of sexual harassment the right to recover for personal
injury damages.488 Similarly, in Ireland sexual harassment is
prohibited as a form of sex discrimination but the law does not
establish employer liability for compensation of victims. 489 Unlike
the UK, Ireland has a narrow definition of employer liability.49°
Because sexual harassment is a form of employee misconduct that
threatens health and safety, the employer is merely responsible for
49'taking steps to minimize the risk that harassment will occur.
Ireland further limits sexual harassment law by allowing the Irish
Labor Court to investigate the charge of harassment using the
482 See Penn, supra note 476, at 162.
483 See id.
484 See id.
485 See Carter, supra note 457, at 436.
486 See id. at 436-37.
487 See id. at 437.
488 See id.
489 See id. at 438.
41 See Penn, supra note 476, at 152-53.
491 See id. at 153 (quoting MICHAEL RUBENSTEIN, THE DIGNITY OF WOMEN AT
WORK 65 (1988)).
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accused harasser's perspective.492 In addition, because a minimum
hourly threshold must be satisfied in order to come under sex
discrimination law coverage, many part-time workers, the majority
of whom are women, are not covered by the laws.43
In some Member States unfair dismissal laws provide a means
of prevention and redress for victims of sexual harassment.494 The
unfair dismissal laws, though, are limited to employees who leave
their jobs.495 In Belgium, for instance, an employee may quit her
job because of sexual harassment and then assert a claim for
compensation under unfair dismissal laws.496 In Ireland the
employer must prove that a dismissal is fair which functions as a
deterrent to a retaliatory discharge if a woman files charges of
sexual harassment.497
Finally, most Member States have laws that require employers
to provide a safe and healthy working environment.
498
Theoretically the health and safety of a workplace is tainted by
sexually harassing behavior. 499  These health and safety laws,
however, do not offer practical solutions to sexual harassment and
often do not provide adequate legal redress9
C. Practical Differences Between US and EU Sexual
Harassment Law
Sexual harassment law in the United States is far more
advanced in its development and its protection of employees than
the laws in the individual Member States. Consequently, U.S.
employers in the EU will likely be protected from liability for
sexual harassment if they maintain a sexual harassment policy that
492 See id. at 153.
493 See id. at 154. Ireland maintains this hourly threshold requirement for economic
reasons. See id. The Irish government asserts that it does not want to discourage
employers from employing part-time employees. See id.
494 See Carter, supra note 457, at 438.
491 See id.
496 See id.
491 See Penn, supra note 476, at 154.
498 See Carter, supra note 457, at 438.
49 See Penn, supra note 476, at 156.
500 See id.
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protects them from liability under Title VII. At the same time,
sexual harassment law is in a state of growth in the EU. With the
annexation to the EU of Finland and Sweden, who both have
impressive equality records, the EU is beginning to make equality
a greater priority.50 ' Consequently the EU is currently considering
implementing a directive binding the Member States to its policy
on sexual harassment that currently exists only in the form of a
non-binding recommendation. The EU recommendation,
however, does not appear to expose employers to greater liability
to sexual harassment claims than U.S. law. The major practical
difference may be in the standard used. In EU law it is a
subjective perspective; the effect of the harasser's conduct would
not be evaluated using the reasonable person standard but rather
by examining how the conduct affected that particular person.
U.S. sexual harassment law, in contrast, utilizes a combination of
both an objective and subjective standard. Consequently, if a
directive is implemented employers may be exposed to greater
liability for sexual harassment claims in the EU than in the US.
VI. Conclusion
The EU is a unique supra-national structure that has no equal
in the present or at any time in the past. The EU is neither a
traditional international organization such as the United Nations
nor a "United States of Europe." The vision of what European
Union means has fundamentally changed the balance of powers
between the Member States and the European Union institutions.
With increasing frequency, American-based multinational
corporations will have to look to the laws of the EU to find
answers in the area of employment and labor law. Consequently,
they must achieve a working knowledge and understanding of the
EU political and legal framework in order to anticipate this
changing and expanding area of the law. With sex equality law
occupying center stage for administrators and litigators,
competence in this field is essential to the successful operation of
American-based multinational corporations in the EU.
URSULA R. KUBAL
101 See id.
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